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Why  Has  the  Natural  Rate 
of  Unemployment Increased 
over  Time? 
IN 1970, when Robert  Hall asked, "Why  Is the Unemployment  Rate So 
High  at Full Employment?"  the unemployment  rate  for adult  men stood 
at 3.5 percent.  i That  rate, which had  been substantially  below that  level 
throughout  the late 1960s,  would  climb  to 4.4 percent  in the recession of 
1971.  More recently, after  the longest economic expansion  of the post- 
war  period,  the unemployment  rate of prime-aged  men in the late 1980s 
settled at just below 5 percent of the labor  force. What  changes in the 
American  labor  market  led to this apparent  secular  increase  in the natu- 
ral  rate  of unemployment?  Twenty  years  later,  we revisit  Hall's question 
and  turn  up some new answers. 
This paper  studies the evolution of male unemployment  and nonpar- 
ticipation  in the U.S. labor  force since 1967.  In looking  at these develop- 
ments, we have two main  goals. The first  is to document  the substantial 
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and important  changes in the amount of nonemployed  time reported 
over the period. Using microdata  from the Current  Population  Survey 
for more  than  500,000  prime-aged  men, we examine  secular  and  cyclical 
changes in nonwork-including both unemployment  and nonparticipa- 
tion in the labor  force-and  the distribution  of these changes  among  dif- 
ferent  demographic  and  skill-based  groups.  We find  that  secular  changes 
in unemployment  and  nonparticipation  are similar  in terms  of the overall 
change  and  its distribution.  A major  finding  is that  the significant  secular 
increases in unemployment,  nonparticipation,  and nonemployment  are 
heavily  concentrated  among  less skilled  individuals.  Increases  injobless 
time among  the less skilled  largely  account for the aggregate  increases 
in these variables. 
Our  second goal is to suggest a unified  explanation  for these results. 
Given the long period  over which these changes have occurred,  we es- 
chew traditional  and  neo-Keynesian  theories  of cyclical unemployment, 
which are founded on temporary  wage and price inflexibility, menu 
costs, or other market  imperfections.  Neither can we find evidence to 
support  more recent natural-rate  theories of changing  unemployment, 
which stress variation  in the rates of sectoral  mobility  and the realloca- 
tion of workers.2  Instead  we are led to standard  demand  and supply  fac- 
tors as an explanation  for the increase  in nonwork.  Building  on evidence 
of sluggish  real  wage growth  and rising  wage inequality  over the past 20 
years, we tie observed  patterns  of wage growth  to long-term  changes  in 
unemployment  and nonparticipation.  We find that rising  joblessness is 
concentrated  among  groups  with declining  real  wages; groups  with con- 
stant or rising  real wages show stable or declining  unemployment  and 
nonparticipation.  We also find that most of the secular  increase in job- 
lessness since the early 1970s  is consistent with shifts in relative labor 
demand among groups, coupled with flexible wages and stable labor 
supply. 
For these reasons, we are left with little doubt  that secular  increases 
in both unemployment  and  nonparticipation  are  demand  driven.  What  is 
more, changes in unemployment  understate  the effect of declining  de- 
mand  on male  joblessness and welfare, making  unemployment  a poor 
measure  of labor  market  performance.  Our  results  also imply  that  unem- 
ployment  rates  are not strictly  comparable  over time. A rate  of 5 percent 
2.  Lilien (1982); Davis (1987). Chinhui  Juhn, Kevin  M. Murphy,  and Robert  H. Topel  77 
at the end of the 1980s  means something  much different  from a similar 
rate  in the 1970s.  The paper  contains  a large  number  of detailed  results, 
which can be grouped  into seven main  categories. 
Cyclical and secular components  of nonworking time. By definition, 
nonworking  time  comprises  periods  of unemployment  and  nonparticipa- 
tion in the labor  force. Decomposing  changes in nonworking  time into 
cyclical  and secular  components,  we find  that  virtually  all of the cyclical 
variation  in nonwork  is accounted  for by fluctuations  in unemployment. 
For men, participation  does not vary to any important  degree over the 
business cycle. On the contrary,  both nonparticipation  and unemploy- 
ment contribute  to a strong  secular increase in nonworking  time. Be- 
tween the periods 1967-69  and 1987-89,  the average  annual  nonworking 
time  of prime-aged  men increased  by about  2.5 weeks, or by 76 percent. 
About half of this change was due to a secular increase in unemploy- 
ment, and  the rest was due to a roughly  equal  decline in labor  force par- 
ticipation.  This similarity  of the secular  increases  in unemployment  and 
nonparticipation  points to a single explanation  for their  trends. Indeed, 
as a first  approximation,  our evidence suggests that there  is little useful 
distinction  between  long-term  changes  in unemployment  and  nonpartic- 
ipation  in the labor  market. 
The importance of long jobless  spells.  To interpret data on the inci- 
dence and duration  of unemployment  and nonparticipation  spells, one 
can speak  in terms  of labor  market  flows. The data  indicate  that  rates of 
entry into unemployment  increased  over time, while average  exit rates 
from  unemployment  declined. Each of these changes  in average  transi- 
tion rates  accounts  for about  half  of the long-term  increase  in unemploy- 
ment.  A second  way to interpret  the data  simply  counts  the spells of vari- 
ous lengths. In an accounting sense, most of the secular increase in 
nonwork  and its components  is the result of an increased  incidence of 
long  jobless spells. Overall,  nearly  80 percent  of the long-term  increase 
in nonwork  is accounted  for by spells lasting  more than  six months. Al- 
though long unemployment  spells have played a role, the most im- 
portant  component  is a dramatic  increase  in the number  of men who are 
permanently  out of the labor market. This increase began in the late 
1970s  and continued  throughout  the 1980s.  Permanent  withdrawal  from 
the labor  market  accounts  for all of the secular  increase  in nonparticipa- 
tion; temporary  withdrawals  from the labor force have been stable or 
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The inequality of rising joblessness.  Based on observable  indicators 
of skill like experience and education, it is well known that unemploy- 
ment is greater  among less skilled individuals.  Murphy  and Topel de- 
tailed these patterns  and their changes in a 1987  study, in which it was 
found  that  the timing  and  the size of changes  in unemployment  were sim- 
ilar across identifiable groups.3 That study concluded that relative 
changes in unemployment  rates were of secondary importance  in ex- 
plaining  the trend  toward  rising  unemployment.  In this paper,  we take a 
different  approach.  As in Juhn's  previous  work, we define  skill  in terms 
of relative productivity,  as reflected  by an individual's  position in the 
overall distribution  of wage offers.4  Using this definition,  we find that 
risingjoblessness  has  been heavily  concentrated  on less skilled  individu- 
als. For persons in the lowest decile of the wage distribution,  we esti- 
mate that  jobless time increased  by more than 16 percentage  points (8 
weeks) between the late 1960s  and the late 1980s.  By contrast,  workers 
above the median of the wage distribution  experienced virtually no 
change in nonworking  time over this period. Comparing  this inequality 
in secular changes with the typical cyclical pattern  of joblessness, we 
find  that the long-term  increase  in nonworking  time is distributed  much 
more  unequally  across skill  groups  than  the cyclical increase  that  occurs 
during  a typical  recession. Again,  this suggests  that secular  and cyclical 
changes  in  joblessness are conceptually  distinct. 
For each skill  group,  similar  patterns  emerge  for both unemployment 
and nonparticipation.  Perhaps  our most surprising  result is that long- 
term increases in unemployment  and nonparticipation  are about the 
same size within  a skill  group,  although  their  changes  are very different 
across skill  categories.  For example,  for the least skilled  decile of work- 
ers, annual  unemployment  increased  by about  4 weeks between the pe- 
riods 1967-69  and 1987-89, while nonparticipation  increased  by nearly 
5 weeks. For the median  worker, however, these changes were only a 
seventh  as large,  and  for workers  above the median  of the wage distribu- 
tion both unemployment and nonparticipation  were essentially un- 
changed. These patterns differ greatly from what occurs in a typical 
cyclical contraction,  during  which all skill groups  experience rising  un- 
employment  while nonparticipation  remains  unchanged.  Though  this is 
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evidence against  aggregate  demand  explanations  of the secular  increase 
in jobless time, we also find that nonparticipation  rates of less skilled 
persons  react  to labor  demand  in the long run.  This discouraged-worker 
effect means  that  the unemployment  rate  is a poor indicator  of the effect 
of labor  demand  on male  joblessness in the long run. 
Sectoral mobility  and unemployment.  The natural  rate of unemploy- 
ment  results  from  the costly reallocation  of workers  as relative  demand 
or productivity  changes.5  While  formal  developments  of the theory  gen- 
erate a constant  natural  rate,6  it is plausible  that  in a dynamic  economy 
some periods require  more reallocation  than others. Then, the natural 
rate  may  vary, with  periods  of high  unemployment  corresponding  to pe- 
riods of unusually  high worker  mobility  and reallocation.7  Yet Murphy 
and  Topel  found  that  mobility  is strongly  procyclical,  and  that  rising  un- 
employment  has been associated with a long-term  decline in sectoral 
mobility.8  Their  evidence casts doubt  on sectoral  mobility  theories of a 
changing  natural  rate. 
We extend those previous findings  in light of our results on the in- 
equality  of rising  unemployment.  Contrary  to the predictions  of reallo- 
cation  models, we find  that  groups  with  rising  unemployment  do not ac- 
count for an increasing  portion  of total mobility. Less skilled workers 
are both more mobile and more likely to be unemployed,  but relative 
mobility  rates among skill groups have been constant over time while 
relative  unemployment  rates  have changed  dramatically.  Neither  do we 
find  any evidence that  "movers"  account  for an increasing  share  of total 
unemployment,  even in the skill  categories  in which unemployment  has 
increased  the most. In light of these results, we are unable  to attribute 
any of the apparent  increase in the natural  rate of unemployment  to 
changes  in the pace of labor  reallocation  in the U.S. economy. 
Labor  supply  and household  income. An alternative  explanation  for 
rising  joblessness is that labor supply has declined. For example, the 
dramatic  increase  in female labor  force participation  and female wages 
since the 1960s  may  have reduced  male  labor  supply  through  wealth  and 
substitution  effects within households. Yet we find that the largest in- 
creases in women's participation  and income occurred in the house- 
5. Friedman  (1968);  Phelps  (1970). 
6. Lucas  and  Prescott  (1974);  Hall  (1979). 
7. Black  (1982);  Lilien  (1982). 
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holds of high-wage  men, who exhibit stable employment  patterns  over 
time. Still, real  household  incomes of low-wage  men have risen slightly; 
thus the sharp  decline in their  earnings  was offset by increasing  income 
from  other sources. 
Jobless men, especially those with long spells of nonwork,  are much 
more likely to be single and to rely on extended family for support. 
These patterns  have remained  stable  and  are  common  to both the unem- 
ployed and those who have left the labor  force. Interestingly,  while the 
number  of jobless men has increased  and the wages they can command 
have fallen, real household  incomes of jobless men have been roughly 
constant. By this measure,  the absolute  welfare  of nonworkers  has not 
deteriorated.  But since household incomes rose in the population of 
working  men, the relative  welfare  of male nonworkers  has declined. 
Flexible wages and stable labor supply. Our evidence  shows that em- 
ployment and labor force participation  declined most among groups 
with declining  wages. We formalize  this connection  by estimating  labor 
supply  responses  for various  skill  groups  from  two independent  sources 
of information.  First, we use the cross-sectional relationship  between 
wages and time worked.9  Our  evidence shows that this "labor  supply" 
relationship  is positive-high-wage  persons work more-and  it is re- 
markably stable within the period when aggregate wages and time 
worked  have  fallen. We estimate  that  labor  supply  elasticities  are  largest 
among  low-wage men, for whom wages and employment  fell the most. 
Using this approach,  a simple model that posits stable long-run  labor 
supply, combined  with declining  demand  for less skilled workers, can 
account  for virtually  all of the secular  increase  injoblessness since 1970. 
Moreover,  this model is remarkably  accurate  in predicting  the distribu- 
tion of rising  joblessness across different  skill  groups. 
A second, independent  source of information  is based on time series 
changes in relative economic performance  across regional  labor mar- 
kets. Assuming  these changes to be demand  driven, we estimate labor 
supply elasticities for different skill groups from relative changes in 
wages and employment  rates across regions. The resulting  estimates  of 
labor  supply  responses are nearly  identical  to those derived  from  cross- 
sectional data. Again, the model is remarkably  accurate  in accounting 
for both rising  joblessness and  its distribution  across skill  groups. 
9. Juhn  (1991)  uses this technique. Chinhui  Juhn, Kevin  M. Murphy,  and  Robert  H. Topel  81 
A stable labor supply  model is less successful in predicting  the divi- 
sion of nonemployment  between unemployment  and nonparticipation. 
The procedures  we employ tend to overestimate  the long-run  increase 
in unemployment  and  to underestimate  the long-run  increase  in nonpar- 
ticipation.  We provide  evidence suggesting  that  discouraged-worker  ef- 
fects play  a role here. Shocks to labor  demand  generate  rising  unemploy- 
ment, some of which is translated  into increased  nonparticipation  in the 
long run. 
The magnitude of wage flexibility. We close with a comparison of var- 
ious methods  of calculating  the extent of wage flexibility  that  is relevant 
for generating employment fluctuations. Macroeconomists typically 
confine  their  analysis to the behavior  of aggregate  wages, calculated  as 
aggregate  real earnings  divided by aggregate  hours worked. We show 
that  this measure  understates  the extent of wage flexibility  that  occurred 
during  this  period  because  it gives disproportionate  weight  both  to work- 
ers with  high  wages and  high  employment  rates,  for whom  wage changes 
were proportionally  the smallest, and to workers  whose labor  supply  is 
relatively  insensitive  to changes  in wages. Correcting  for these biases in 
microdata,  we find  that the wage index that is relevant  for determining 
changes in aggregate  unemployment  and labor force participation  has 
declined  sharply.  Between 1977  and 1989,  our  corrected  wage index de- 
clined by nearly 15 percent. Macroeconomic  analyses based on aggre- 
gate data cannot detect this decline. They therefore  understate  the im- 
portance  of long-term  wage flexibility  in affecting  aggregate  labor  supply 
and changes  in employment. 
Changes in Unemployment  and Participation, 1967-89 
Our  data are drawn  from the Annual  Demographic  Files of the Cur- 
rent Population  Survey (CPS) for the years 1968  through 1990. These 
surveys are random  samples  of about 50,000 U.S. households  and con- 
tain an array  of personal, demographic,  and economic information  on 
individual  household  members.  The files record  information  on each re- 
spondent's  labor  market  status and living arrangements  during  the sur- 
vey week-usually  the third  week in March-as  well as retrospective 
data on aspects of labor market  activity during  the previous calendar 
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ployment  and  unemployment,  as well as the industry  of the longest-held 
job of the year  and  the occupation  associated  with  that  job. Most of what 
follows is based on the retrospective  data;  our estimates  therefore  refer 
to the calendar  years 1967  through  1989. 
Adjustments  to Data 
We focus on men who were out of school for the entire year, who 
were not self-employed, and who had 1 to 30 years of potential labor 
market  experience. For high school graduates  this restriction  yields an 
age range  from 18  to 48 years old; for college graduates  it includes  those 
in their  early  fifties. We ignore  the activities  of older  men, for whom  par- 
ticipation  has fallen sharply,  and of women, who entered  the labor  mar- 
ket in record  numbers  during  the period  we study. We do, however, pro- 
vide evidence on how women's labor market  activities have affected 
male  unemployment  and  participation.  We  place no other  restrictions  on 
the sample.  Persons  included  in the data  for any one year may have par- 
ticipated  in the labor  market  for any amount  of time or not at all. 
Each  respondent  in the CPS  is asked  a set of questions  about  weeks of 
unemployment,  employment,  and nonparticipation  during  the previous 
calendar  year. By design, respondents' weeks of employment, unem- 
ployment, and nonparticipation  in the labor market  are constrained  to 
52. We measure  time spent unemployed  (U), out of the labor  force (0), 
and nonemployed  (N =  U +  0) as the percentage  of the year spent in 
each state.  '0 This  differs  from  the usual  method  of measuring  unemploy- 
ment by dividing  weeks unemployed  by weeks in the labor  force. Our 
approach  better summarizes  the allocation  of time among  employment, 
unemployment,  and nonparticipation. 
For the most part, the structure  of the March  CPS is consistent over 
time so that  data  from  different  years  are  comparable.  However, two im- 
portant  changes occurred  in 1976  that affect our analysis. First, before 
1976,  information  on weeks worked  and  weeks unemployed  in the previ- 
ous calendar  year were recorded  in intervals.  To adjust  for this, we use 
10. A person  out of the labor  force is also referred  to as a nonparticipant.  Published 
unemployment  data  are based  on labor  force status  during  the survey  week. Murphy  and 
Topel  (1987)  and  Akerlof  and  Yellen  (1985)  compare  unemployment  rates  calculated  from 
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information  on continuously  recorded  weeks of employment  and  unem- 
ployment  from  the 1976  and  later  surveys  to impute  within-cell  averages 
for the pre-1976  years. We then apply these averages  to the later years 
as well, in order  to ensure  that  calculations  based on these data  are con- 
sistent  over time."  l 
Second, pre-1976  surveys  do not record  usual  weekly hours.  We have 
calculated  a respondent's average hourly wage as the ratio of annual 
earnings  to annual  hours  worked. In turn,  annual  hours  are the product 
of annual  weeks worked  and usual weekly hours. Thus, to make  earlier 
survey data consistent, we impute the missing information  from ob- 
served  relationships  in the 1976  and later surveys, using  information  on 
hours  worked  in the survey  week, weeks worked  last year,  part-time  sta- 
tus, and  demographic  characteristics."2 
Changing Rates  of Joblessness 
Figure 1 displays  the evolution  of aggregate  unemployment,  nonpar- 
ticipation,  and  nonemployment  rates  among  adult  men since 1967.  Since 
the base for calculating  these rates  is 52 weeks for each individual  in the 
data,  these estimates  can also be thought  of as the percentage  of the male 
population's  potential  labor market  weeks spent in each state. For ex- 
ample,  in 1982  unemployed  weeks accounted  for 9.3 percent  of potential 
male labor supply, while weeks of nonparticipation  accounted for 6.2 
percent. Thus nonwork  accounted  for 15.5  percent  of potential  male la- 
bor supply  in that  year. 
There  are two points  of interest  about  the figure.  First, fluctuations  in 
unemployment  account  for virtually  all of the high-frequency  (cyclical) 
variations  in employment. High-frequency  variations  in participation 
are simply not important  among  adult  men.13 Put differently,  short-run 
changes in labor demand  move workers one-for-one  between employ- 
11. The same approach  was used in Murphy  and  Topel (1987).  Details  of this proce- 
dure  are  described  in an appendix  available  from  the authors. 
12. Details  of this procedure  are also described  in the appendix  available  from  the au- 
thors. 
13. This  finding  is implicit  in the results  of Clark  and  Summers  (1981),  who emphasize 
the importance  of fluctuations  in labor  market  participation  over  the business  cycle. Virtu- 
ally all of the cyclical  variation  in labor  market  participation  is accounted  for by teenaged 
men, men  over 65, and  young  women. 84  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
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of unemployment  and  nonparticipation.  The  rates  shown  in the figure  are  averages  of individual  rates  for  the indicated 
years. 
ment  and  unemployment;  there  are no important  discouraged-worker  or 
other  effects on participation  decisions. 
Figure 1 also suggests the opposite interpretation  for low-frequency 
(secular)  changes  in unemployment  and  participation.  While  unemploy- 
ment  is clearly  more  volatile  than  nonparticipation,  both  have increased 
at a similar  rate. For example, after  the longest continual  decline in un- 
employment  in postwar  history, the adult  male  unemployment  rate set- 
tled at about  4.5 percent  in 1989.  This cyclical low is above the cyclical 
peak that  occurred  in the 1971  recession (see table 1). Between 1969  and 
1989, both years near the end of prolonged  economic expansions, the 
secular  increases  in unemployment  and  nonparticipation  for prime-aged 
men are 2.3 and 2.4 percentage  points, respectively. Thus, the full-em- 
ployment,  or natural,  rates  of both unemployment  and nonparticipation 
appear  to have risen  over time. 
Most empirical  treatments  of the natural  rate are mechanical  exer- 
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Table 1. Nonemployment  Measures  for Adult  Men, 1967-89 
Percent 
Un-  Non-  Non- 
Period  employment  participation  employment 
1967-69  2.14  4.03  6.18 
1970-71  4.16  4.71  8.87 
1972-73  3.74  4.84  8.58 
1975-76  6.68  5.39  12.07 
1977-78  4.83  5.72  10.55 
1982-83  8.81  6.04  14.84 
198749  4.47  6.42  10.89 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from  annual  March  Current  Population  Survey  (CPS).  The estimates  represent  the 
average  percentage  of the year spent in each category  and are based on retrospective  CPS data  for each calendar 
year. 
acteristics.  14 As such, changes  in the natural  rate  can occur  only through 
changes in the labor  force shares of different  demographic  groups:  for 
example, an increase  in the share  of young workers  would increase the 
natural  rate because unemployment  is higher  among  the young. By ex- 
tension, larger shares of groups with high rates of nonparticipation 
would increase the natural  rate of nonparticipation  in the labor force. 
But such changes do not explain the trends in figure 1. We broke the 
sample into 96 cells representing  six categories of experience, four of 
education,  two of race, and two of marital  status. We fixed the within- 
cell unemployment  and  nonparticipation  rates  at their  average  values  for 
the 1967-69  period but allowed the shares of each group to vary over 
time. The resulting  series, called U and 0 in figure  2, show how aggre- 
gate unemployment  and nonparticipation  would have behaved if the 
within-cell  rates had remained  constant  at their 1967-69  levels. The ob- 
vious point is that both cyclical and secular  changes in the rates of job- 
lessness were generated  by changes within labor force groups not by 
changes  across labor  force groups.  The effects of changing  demograph- 
ics are hardly  discernible.15 
14. The discussions  in Hall and Taylor  (1986),  Dornbusch  and Fischer  (1990),  Barro 
(1990),  and  Gordon  (1990)  are  representative. 
15. As pointed  out in Murphy  and  Topel  (1987),  the share  of highly  educated  workers 
increased  through  time,  which  would  lead  to lower  unemployment  because  more  educated 
workers  are  less likely  to be unemployed.  At the same  time, marriage  rates  have  declined, 
which would raise unemployment  because unemployment  is higher  among  single men. 
These effects cancel  out in U and  0 in figure  2, so the predicted  series  are  flat. 86  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Figure 2.  The Effect of Labor Force Demographics on Unemployment 
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four  of education,  two of race, and  two of marital  status)  constant  at their  1967-69  levels and  allowing  only the share 
of each labor  force  group  to change  over time. The changes  in the hypothetical  rates  over time  therefore  result  only 
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The Keynesian interpretation  of cyclical differences in unemploy- 
ment  relies on short-run  inflexibility  of wages and prices. Thus, shocks 
to the demand  for labor  generate  short-run  quantity  adjustments  in the 
form  of unemployment.  Whether  or not that  view is accurate  in the short 
run, it is surely strained  in the longer  run, over which wages and prices 
are  presumably  flexible  and  labor  is mobile  among  activities. In terms  of 
figure  2, it is difficult  to argue  that the rise in actual unemployment  be- 
tween the late 1960s  and  late 1980s  was generated  by deficient  aggregate 
demand  or by a sustained  failure  of markets  to clear. Contrary  to many 
interpretations  of traditional  macroeconomic  theories,  16 our view of the 
secular  rise in unemployment  suggests  that  the full-employment  rates  of 
unemployment  and  nonparticipation  are not intertemporal  constants  to- 
ward which the economy tends to gravitate over time. Instead, as 
pointed out by Edmund Phelps,'7 the natural  rate may change with 
changes  in the structure  of labor  demands  or with  changes  in the returns 
to nonwork.  But  which  factors  have changed?  The similarity  of the secu- 
lar increases in unemployment  and nonparticipation  is a major  clue. It 
motivates  much  of what  follows. 
Our skepticism  about explanations  based on aggregate  demand  and 
disequilibrium  does not mean that we think demand  factors are unim- 
portant.  As we argue  below, we think  that  declining  labor  demand  is the 
main  explanation  for the long-term  decline  in men's working  time. Some 
initial  support  for this is offered in table 2. The CPS inquires  about the 
main  reason  for nonemployment  among  persons  who did not work  a full 
year. We tabulate  these responses  for four  different  groups  during  three 
nonrecessionary  periods. Annual  nonworkers  are respondents  who re- 
ported no work during  the year, and weekly nonworkers  are respond- 
ents with some nonworking  weeks during  the year. We also distinguish 
nonparticipants  from  other nonworkers.  We learn  from the data that in 
each category the response "could not find work"  increases in impor- 
tance over time. This finding  suggests  a role for a long-run  discouraged- 
worker  effect that  causes some  jobless men to categorize  themselves as 
nonparticipants  rather  than  as unemployed. 
16. Blanchard  and  Summers  (1986). 
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Table  2. Reasons  for Not Working,  Selected  Intervals,  1967-87 
Percent 
Worker's  reason  1967-69  1977-78  1986-87 
Annual  nonworkers 
Could  not find work  7.6  19.8  27.1 
III  74.1  58.2  52.7 
Retired  or other  18.3  21.9  20.2 
Annual  nonparticipants 
Could  not find work  3.8  9.5  16.5 
Ill  77.3  66.1  60.5 
Retired  or other  18.9  24.4  23.0 
Weekly  nonworkers 
Could  not find  work  35.9  48.3  54.0 
III  39.8  26.9  28.4 
Retired  or other  24.4  24.7  17.6 
Weekly  nonparticipants 
Could  not find  work  4.3  5.0  11.6 
III  59.7  49.5  54.5 
Retired  or other  36.0  45.5  33.9 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from March  CPS. Annual  nonworkers  are persons  who worked  no weeks in the 
previous  year.  Annual  nonparticipants  are  those for  whom  most  nonworking  weeks  were  spent  out of the labor  force. 
Weekly  nonworkers  weight  individual  responses  by we4ks  of nonwork,  so the responses  are for a "representative" 
week. Survey  years 1989  and 1990  are  not  comparable  with  earlier  years  because  of changes  in the CPS  questionnaire. 
We therefore  report  results  only through  survey  year 1988  (calendar  year 1987). 
The Importance  of Long Jobless  Spells 
Unemployment  and nonparticipation  rates at any point in time de- 
pend  on the flow of individuals  to and  from  each of these states. We use 
the incidence  of each state (positive  weeks in the state)  in year  t to calcu- 
late hazard  rates.  18 (The  hazard  rate  is defined  as the probability  of mov- 
ing from one state to another  over a short time interval  divided by the 
length of the interval.)  For example, if hu, is the entry hazard  rate for 
unemployment  in year t, then the percentage  of individuals  reporting 
positive unemployed weeks in year t, IUt' is 
IUt  =  1 -  (1  -  u*)  ehu, 
where u* is the unemployment  rate at the beginning  of year t. Then the 
average  annual  entry  rate to unemployment  is simply 
(1)  hU, =  -  log[(1  -  Iut)/(l  -  u*)]. 
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Similar  calculations  for nonparticipation  yield 
(2)  hot -  -log[(1  -  Iotl)(1 -  o*)] 
where o* is the nonparticipation  rate at the beginning  of year t. Given 
equations 1 and 2, the changes in unemployment  and nonparticipation 
from  year t to year t +  1  are determined  by inflows  and  outflows: 
(3)  u* I 
-  U* =  (I -  u,)hu,-  -th' 
(4)  *t  _  t 
*  -  o*  = (1 -  ot)hot -  oth' 
where  h' is the exit hazard  rate  from  state i (U or 0) in year t, and  ut  and 
ot are the average  unemployment  and nonparticipation  rates in year t. 
These exit rates  can be calculated  from  equations  3 and  4 given previous 
estimates of hut  and hot. In empirical  analysis of equations 1-4 we re- 
place u* by u,.19 
Figure 3 summarizes  the behavior of entry rates and durations  of 
spells of unemployment,  nonparticipation,  and nonemployment  over 
the 1967-89  period. The estimates  are scaled relative  to their  mean val- 
ues over the full period of the data. Durations  are measured  as 1/h'it, 
which is the average duration  of spells when the exit rate is constant. 
Changes  in average  entry  rates and average  durations  together  account 
for changes in jobless rates over time. For unemployment,  entry rates 
and durations  move together at both cyclical and secular  frequencies, 
though  the entry  rate declined  much  more  rapidly  than  did  durations  af- 
ter the recession of 1982.  For example, the entry  rate  to unemployment 
in 1987  was close to the rate  in 1973,  but  the average  unemployment  rate 
was 1.6 percentage  points lower in 1973  than in 1987.  The difference  in 
unemployment  rates between these years is accounted  for by a change 
in the duration  of unemployment-spells lasted about  25 percent  longer 
in the late 1980s  than  in the early 1970s.  In fact, durations  of unemploy- 
ment  in the late 1980s  are  not far  from  their  cyclical peak  in the recession 
of 1975. 
The data  are even more striking  for nonparticipation.  After  the entry 
rate peaked  in 1978,  the flow of workers  out of the labor  force declined 
dramatically.  In the late 1980s,  average  flows out of the labor  force were 
19. To check the validity  of this substitution,  we replaced  u* by weighted  averages  of 
u, and u,  I and by the unemployment  rate  in the survey  week of year t. The substitution 
did  not materially  affect  the results. Figure 3.  Entry Rates and Duration of Spells of Unemployment, Nonparticipation, 
and Nonemployment, Relative to Mean,  1967-89 
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as described in the text and summarized by equations 1-4. Duration is the inverse exit hazard rate from unemployment, 
nonparticipation, or nonemployment.  All estimates  are indexed  to their respective  means over  the sample period. 
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about 25 percent lower than the corresponding  flows in the late 1960s. 
Taken alone, this decline would have caused nonparticipation  to fall 
throughout  the 1980s,  but  the decline  in entry  rates  was offset by an even 
larger  proportional  increase  in the average  duration  of nonparticipation. 
Thus, the nonparticipation  rate actually  increased. Putting  these trends 
together  with those for the unemployment  flows, we show in the bottom 
panel of the figure the entry rates and durations  of nonemployment. 
These entry  rates  and  durations  were roughly  coincident  until  the reces- 
sion of 1982.  Since then, flows out of employment  declined  sharply,  but 
the durations  of joblessness remained  high. The result is that the sub- 
stantially  greater  stability  of employment  after 1982  was not matched  by 
higher  rates of finding  or accepting  jobs. 
These calculations  may  even understate  the importance  of long spells 
in contributing  to rising  joblessness. In studying  unemployment  only, 
Murphy  and Topel found in an earlier  study that the frequency  of short 
spells (less than 15 weeks) remained  nearly  constant through  time, but 
the increased  incidence  of spells  lasting  more  than  six months  accounted 
for about  two-thirds  of the long-term  increase  in total unemployment.20 
We confirm  that finding  here and also find that the rising incidence of 
very long spells is even more  important  in accounting  for the rising  rate 
of nonparticipation.  These points are documented  in table  3. 
The table decomposes the average  number  of weeks of nonemploy- 
ment, unemployment,  and nonparticipation  into contributions  made  by 
spells of various  lengths. For expository  purposes,  we have divided  the 
sample  period  into representative  subperiods  during  which market  con- 
ditions were roughly  similar.  For example, the table shows that in the 
1972-73 period the average number  of unemployed  weeks per person 
was 1.946. Also, persons who were unemployed  for 1-13 weeks ac- 
counted for 20.9 percent of the unemployment,  whereas persons with 
long spells ofjoblessness, more  than  six months,  accounted  for 39.5 per- 
cent. These tabulations  indicate  that  between 1972-73  and 1987-89,  the 
36 percent  increase in these long spells accounted  for 73 percent of the 
overall  increase  in unemployed  weeks. 
Long spells are even more  important  in accounting  for rising  nonpar- 
ticipation.  The relative  importance  of temporary  spells of nonparticipa- 
tion (less than  52 weeks) has declined  sharply  over the full period,  while 
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Table 3.  Rising Nonemployment and the Role of Long Spells,  1967-89 
Distribution  in percent 
Employment  Average  Distribution  by spell duration  in weeks 
status and  weeks 
period  per year  1-13  14-26  27-39  40-51  52  1-26  27-52 
Nonemployment 
1967-69  3.211  19.8  19.3  18.1  14.5  28.2  39.1  60.9 
1970-71  4.613  14.7  19.3  21.3  15.5  29.2  34.0  66.0 
1972-73  4.463  14.3  17.5  21.6  15.0  31.5  31.9  68.1 
1975-76  6.277  14.2  22.0  17.4  14.0  32.4  36.2  63.8 
1977-78  5.485  16.6  22.8  15.5  12.6  32.6  39.3  60.7 
1982-83  7.718  10.5  19.8  15.9  16.1  37.7  30.3  69.7 
1987-89  5.658  12.5  18.9  13.5  13.3  41.8  31.4  68.6 
Unemployment 
1967-69  1.114  30.5  42.4  14.7  8.8  3.6  72.9  27.1 
1970-71  2.168  20.8  41.0  21.2  10.6  6.4  61.8  38.2 
1972-73  1.946  20.9  39.7  21.1  10.2  8.2  60.5  39.5 
1975-76  3.481  18.0  31.4  22.6  15.4  12.6  49.4  50.6 
1977-78  2.514  24.0  35.0  19.9  12.7  8.4  59.0  41.0 
1982-83  4.586  13.8  29.2  21.8  19.2  16.1  43.0  57.0 
1987-89  2.324  21.4  33.7  19.4  16.0  9.5  55.1  44.9 
Nonpar ticipationi 
1967-69  2.097  18.6  14.4  14.2  13.6  39.2  33.0  67.0 
1970-71  2.444  15.1  13.9  14.0  12.8  44.3  28.9  71.1 
1972-73  2.516  14.3  13.1  14.5  12.7  45.4  27.4  72.6 
1975-76  2.797  15.0  14.1  10.2  9.7  51.1  29.1  70.9 
1977-78  2.968  16.0  14.8  10.7  11.4  47.2  30.7  69.3 
1982-83  3.138  11.1  10.9  7.8  11.1  59.1  22.0  78.0 
1987-89  3.337  10.3  11.1  8.6  10.9  59.1  21.4  78.6 
Source: Authors'  calculations  from  retrospective  CPS  data  on individuals'  weeks in each  employment  state  during 
the indicated  calendar  years. 
the frequency  of permanent  withdrawal  from the labor  force (52 weeks 
of nonwork)  has more  than  doubled.  In fact, the percentage  of all work- 
ers with some time spent out of the labor  force was roughly  the same in 
the late 1980s  as it was in the 1960s. In the 1967-69  period, roughly 10 
percent  of all men had some weeks of nonparticipation,  compared  with 
9.5 percent  in the late 1980s.2t  Yet in the 1960s  only 1.6 percent  of men 
were out of the labor  force for a full 52 weeks. The corresponding  figure 
for the late 1980s  is 3.8 percent. This shift toward  complete  labor  force 
withdrawal  accounts for all of the secular  increase in the nonparticipa- 
21. These percentages  refer  to the average  fraction  of men  who had  positive  weeks of 
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tion rate of prime-aged  men.22  The shift implies that average  transition 
rates  inadequately  describe  the factors  that  underlie  rising  nonparticipa- 
tion. It is not simply  that average  exit rates from nonparticipation  have 
declined;  rather,  an increasing  number  of men  have permanently  left the 
labor  force. 
Changes in the Skill Distribution  of Joblessness 
It is well known that at any point in time less skilled  individuals  are 
more  likely to be unemployed  than  higher  skilled  workers. Usual meth- 
ods of indexing  skills  rely  on observable  characteristics  of workers,  such 
as education,  marital  status, occupation,  and  experience. We take a dif- 
ferent  approach,  categorizing  individuals  based on their  percentile  posi- 
tion in the distribution  of average  hourly  wages for each year. Persons 
from  different  years  who have the same  rank  in the wage distribution  are 
considered to have the same relative level of marketable  skills, as in- 
dexed by earning  power. Thus, if the wages of workers  in the first  decile 
of the distribution  fall, we infer  that  the price of their  skills has fallen as 
well. 
One interpretation  of this way of ranking  individuals  is that relative 
skill is a fixed individual  characteristic.  Thus, a change in the relative 
prices  of skills  changes  the distribution  of wages for persons  with differ- 
ent talents. This interpretation  is unnecessarily restrictive, however. 
Nothing in our approach  precludes mobility of individuals  within the 
wage distribution;  those who were in the lowest wage decile in 1989  may 
have had  higher  relative  wages in other  years. Whether  this kind  of mo- 
bility is significant  could be answered  with panel data, but that issue is 
beyond  the scope of this paper.  It also has little  bearing  on the following 
results. 
Imputing  Wages to Nonworkers 
A drawback  of our wage-based  approach  is that it's easier said than 
done. We regressed  log hourly  wages on a quartic  in experience  and  then 
22. Average  weeks of nonparticipation  increased  by 1.24  weeks  (3.34 -  2.10)  between 
1967-69  and 1987-89.  Of this, 1.15  weeks are accounted  for by an increase  in the propor- 
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Table 4.  Wages, Completed Schooling, and Living Arrangements by Annual Number 
of Weeks Worked, 1982-89 
Percent 
Mean  Living arrangement 
Weeks  deviation  Years  of completed  schooling  With 
wtorked  of log  Fewer  With  other 
last year  *  wage  than 12  12  13-15  16  spouse  family 
0  -0.43  43.6  37.4  11.4  7.5  40.1  42.7 
1-13  -0.43  38.5  42.5  11.7  7.3  46.0  37.6 
14-26  -0.30  31.1  45.3  14.4  9.2  53.8  29.1 
27-39  -0.22  26.1  46.1  15.7  12.2  60.7  21.7 
40-47  -0.14  20.8  44.4  18.7  16.1  63.3  17.7 
48-49  -0.11  19.1  43.8  18.6  18.5  67.4  15.2 
50-52  0.04  11.6  37.7  20.5  30.2  73.7  11.2 
Source:  Wage  data  are  survey-week  hourly  wages  from the  outgoing  rotation  groups  of  the  March CPS. The 
reported  mean  deviation  of the log wage  is the average  value  of the residual  from  a regression  of log hourly  wages 
on a quartic  in experience.  For example,  men  who worked  40-47 weeks during  a calendar  year  had  wages  that were 
about 14 percent  lower than  the average  wage for all workers  with comparable  years of labor  market  experience. 
Other  data  are from  the full March  surveys  for those years.  Other  family  refers  to adult  family  members  other  than 
a spouse. 
ranked  individuals  based on their  percentile  position in the distribution 
of the residuals.23  Complications  arise  because many  individuals  did not 
work and therefore  do not have any earnings;  their wages must be im- 
puted. To do this, we considered  information  on the wages, completed 
schooling, and living arrangements  of persons with various  amounts  of 
time  worked  during  a calendar  year  (see table  4). Wage  data  for this table 
are drawn  from the outgoing  rotation  groups  of the March  CPS for the 
years 1982-90.24  These records  include information  beyond what is re- 
corded in the usual monthly  survey, including  the current  hourly  wage 
for persons who worked during  the survey week. By using the sub- 
sample  of persons  who worked  during  the survey week but who had no 
earnings  during  the previous calendar  year, we can partially  gauge the 
earning  power  of nonworkers. 
23. We first  projected  on experience  because  of considerations  of life-cycle  labor  sup- 
ply and  human  capital  investment.  Since  the true  returns  to work  include  the wage  and  the 
present  value  of human  capital  accumulated  through  on-the-job  training,  we were wary  of 
treating,  say, a 20-year-old  and a 40-year-old  with the same wage as having  identical  re- 
turns  to work. By projecting  out a positively  inclined  experience  profile,  we treat young 
and old workers  with identical  wages relative to their  cohorts as having  the same work 
incentives.  There  is no guarantee  that  this is the appropriate  method.  But  results  based  on 
raw  wages, without  removing  experience  effects, are  not much  different. 
24. Comparable  data  for other  years are not available.  The CPS samples  households 
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The table shows that those with higher  wages typically work more. 
Persons  who work more also have more schooling. They are also more 
likely to be married  and less likely to live with other adult  family mem- 
bers. Most important,  earnings  and  other  observable  characteristics  are 
similar  for those who did no work in the previous year and those who 
worked 1 to 13 weeks. Their average  log wages are identical  and well 
below the wages of any other group. Nonworkers have slightly less 
schooling  than  those who work  only a small  amount,  are  less likely to be 
married  than  any other  group,  and  are  more  likely to live with  other  fam- 
ily members. Given these patterns, we think the most reasonable  as- 
sumption  is that  the distribution  of wages that  nonworkers  could expect 
to earn resembles  the observed distribution  among  men who worked 1 
to 13  weeks during  a year.25 
We therefore  imputed  wages to nonworkers  from  the full distribution 
of wages among  those who worked 1 to 13 weeks in the relevant year. 
Each nonworker  was assigned  a vector of ten probabilities,  correspond- 
ing to the relative frequency  in each decile of the wage distribution  of 
persons working 1 to 13 weeks. Each probability  has a corresponding 
mean  log wage for individuals  in that decile. In effect, each nonworker 
contributes  ten observations, each with a weight corresponding  to the 
probability  that  a person  is drawn  from  a particular  decile. 
Measurement  Error in Average  Hourly  Wages 
Our  subsequent  analysis  will seek to explain  changes in  jobless time 
from changes  in the distribution  of wages. For the usual errors-in-vari- 
ables reasons, this means that measurement  error  in calculated  wages 
can be an important  concern.  This is especially  true  if the source of mis- 
measurement  is errors  in recorded  weeks worked,  since this  would  force 
a negative covariance between errors in wages and errors in weeks 
worked. We examined  this possibility  by comparing  the distributions  of 
calculated  and reported  hourly  wages for the outgoing  rotation  groups 
from the 1982-90 March CPS. This comparison  yields two important 
25. Years  of schooling  and  marriage  are  normally  associated  with  higher  wages. Thus 
the figures  in table  4 indicate  that nonworkers  have somewhat  lower average  skills than 
those with positive weeks. This suggests  that  our procedure  may overestimate  the wage 
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conclusions. First, the distribution  of reported  survey-week  wages has 
substantially  less dispersion  than the distribution  of calculated  wages, 
suggesting  that  measurement  error  is important.  Second, the relative  im- 
portance of measurement  error declines with the number of weeks 
worked. 
The consequence of this type of measurement  error  is illustrated  in 
figure  4. Using the outgoing  groups, the upper  panel of the figure  plots 
average  weeks worked  in the past year  against  average  hourly  wages for 
each decile of the wage distribution.  The curve labeled reported  wage 
uses the reported  hourly  wage from the survey week, and the curve la- 
beled calculated  wage  uses the wage calculated  from  retrospective  data. 
It is hard  to ignore  the similarity  between  these curves and  the labor  sup- 
ply schedules that are drawn  in the classroom. Specifically,  notice that 
the curve  based  on calculated  wages bends  back  at high  wages, a feature 
usually attributed  to wealth effects in labor supply. By contrast, the 
relationship  between average weeks worked and reported wages is 
monotonically  positive. This suggests to us that the backward-bending 
portion  of the curve based on calculated  wages is attributable  to mea- 
surement  error:  since measurement  error  declines with weeks worked, 
individuals  who work  few weeks are most often miscategorized  as hav- 
ing high  wages. 
We dealt  with this problem  by adjusting  the distribution  of calculated 
wages in each year.26  We assume that  the difference  between the distri- 
butions  of calculated  and reported  wages in the outgoing  groups  is due 
to measurement  error.  For each percentile  of the wage distribution,  we 
calculated  the wage adjustment  that would make the two distributions 
equal. We then applied  this adjustment  to the retrospective  wage data 
for each year  from 1967  to 1989,  effectively compressing  the wage distri- 
bution in each year by the amount  attributed  to measurement  error.27 
The results of this adjustment  are also illustrated  in figure 4. As ex- 
pected, the adjustment  increases the relationship  between wages and 
weeks worked and eliminates the backward-bending  portion of the 
curve.28 
26. The  appendix  available  from  the authors  describes  the exact methods. 
27. This method  ignores measurement  error  in reported  wages. To the extent that 
these errors  are  also important,  the correction  described  in the text is conservative. 
28. Figure  4 plots the relationship  between  wages and work  in the period  after 1970. 
We show below  that  this relationship  was substantially  different  in the 1960s. Figure  4. Empirical  Relationship  between  Time  Worked  and Alternative  Measures 
of Wages 
Hourly  wage 
(1982 dollars) 
20  1982-89 
Calculated wage 
15 
10  Reported  wage, 
5 
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20  - 
1970-89 
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Sources:  Reported  wages  are reported hourly wages  from the detailed  outgoing  rotations of the March CPS and 
are only available from 1982 to  1990. Calculated wages are annual earnings divided by the product of weeks  worked 
and usual weekly hours. They are from the retrospective  survey data in the CPS. Adjusted wages are calculated wages 
adjusted to correct for measurement error as described  in the,text.  The figure plots the average hours worked in the 
previous  year against the average wage measure for each decile  of the wage distribution. 
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Wages,  Unemployment,  and Nonparticipation 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of unemployment,  nonparticipation, 
and nonemployment  for selected intervals  of the wage distribution.  To 
make  these calculations  we divided  workers  into five groups  according 
to wage percentile:  1-10, 11-20, 21-40, 41-60, and 61-100. We use this 
wage distribution  to proxy for the distribution  of marketable  skills. In 
each of the three  panels,  the lowest line represents  the series  for workers 
with the highest  wages. The other  lines are perfectly  rank  ordered-the 
highest unemployment and nonparticipation  rates are for the least 
skilled, and so on. This outcome was expected. More interesting  is the 
clear fanning  out of each series over time. These pronounced  trends  to- 
ward greater  inequality  in the distributions  of unemployment  and non- 
participation  imply that nearly all of the long-term  increase in these 
two  jobless rates falls on less skilled  individuals. 
Table 5 quantifies  these trends. It reports  the within-group  changes 
in unemployment,  nonparticipation,  and  nonemployment  rates  between 
the economic peaks of 1967-69  and 1987-89.  For the least skilled  work- 
ers, the nonemployment  rate rose by nearly 16 percentage  points be- 
tween 1967-69  and 1987-89, the equivalent  of 8 weeks a year. This in- 
crease  had roughly equal parts of  increasing unemployment (7.1 
percentage  points) and nonparticipation  (9.2 points). In fact, although 
the long-term increase in nonemployment is  unequally distributed 
across skill  groups,  the component  increases  in unemployment  and  non- 
participation  are remarkably  similar  within  each group. Finally, notice 
that  for the top 40 percent  of wage earners  the nonemployment  rate in- 
creased  by a negligible  0.1 percentage  point. In other  words, unemploy- 
ment and labor  force participation  are virtually  unchanged  for workers 
above the center  of the wage distribution.  Thus, to understand  why  job- 
lessness has risen, we must explain why it has risen only among less 
skilled  persons. 
Changes  in the Relative  Demand for  Skills 
These  long-term patterns of  joblessness  suggest  conformable 
changes in labor  demand  favoring  more skilled  workers. Figure  6 sum- 
marizes  the evolution  of relative  hourly  wages among  the five skill cate- Figure 5.  Unemployment, Nonparticipation, and Nonemployment Rates by Percentiles 
of the Wage Distribution, 1967-89 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  from  the March  CPS.  The lines  represent  average  percentages  of each  calendar  year 
spent in unemployment,  nonparticipation,  and nonemployment  by persons  in the indicated  percentile  range  of the 
wage  distribution. 
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Table  5. Changes  in Nonemployment  by Percentiles  of the Wage  Distribution, 
1967-69  to 1987-89 
Percentage  points 
Wage  Change  in  Change  in  Change in 
percentiles  unemployment  nonparticipation  nonemployment 
1-10  7.08  9.23  16.30 
11-20  5.57  6.59  12.56 
21-40  3.13  3.46  6.60 
41-60  1.45  0.92  2.36 
61-100  0.37  - 0.29  0.09 
1-100  2.33  2.38  4.71 
Source: Authors'  calculations  from  March  CPS. The table  reports  percentage  point  changes  in the proportion  of 
the year  spent  in each state between  1967-69  and 1987-89. 
gories used in figure 5. The figure shows the experience-adjusted  distri- 
bution of log weekly  wages  for each  year of our data, relative  to the 
distribution in 1970. Its clear message  is that wage inequality has stead- 
ily increased since the early 1970s. For workers in the bottom decile of 
the wage distribution, real wages fell by more than 30 percent between 
1970 and the  late  1980s. These  are the  individuals  who  showed  the 
largest  secular  increases  in unemployment  and nonparticipation.  By 
contrast, the real wages of persons in the top 40 percent of the skill distri- 
bution had stable real wages over the period. And these are the individu- 
als who showed stable unemployment and participation rates. Taken to- 
gether,  the evidence  suggests  that nonneutral changes  in the long-run 
demand for labor, coupled with wages that are flexible in the long run, 
may be the major factor in explaining changing jobless  rates. 
Alternative  Explanations  for the Rising  Natural  Rate 
Students of the business cycle will not be surprised that when unem- 
ployment  rises,  it rises  more for less  skilled persons.  For example,  in 
a typical recession,  changes  in unemployment  rates are higher among 
persons  in low-wage  occupations  and for individuals with less  experi- 
ence and education, the main observable indicators of skills. Chinhui  Juhn, Kevin  M. Murphy,  and  Robert  H. Topel  101 
Figure 6.  Real Hourly Wages Relative to 1970 by Percentiles of the Wage Distribution, 
1967-89 
Percent  difference 
from 1970 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  from March  CPS. The figure  shows the evolution  of relative hourly earnings, 
measured  by the difference  of the annual  average  of log weekly  wages  and the 1970  average  of log weekly  wages  for 
the indicated  percentiles  of the wage  distribution.  See the text for a description  of methods. 
Declining  Aggregate  Demand 
Figure  5 shows that  this low wage-high unemployment  pattern  holds 
for our skill  categories:  in each of the recessions of 1971,  1975,  and 1982, 
unemployment  rose by more  for persons  in the lower deciles of the wage 
distribution.  Thus  a Keynesian  explanation  for our  findings  would  be de- 
ficient  aggregate  demand  tied to inflexible  wages, whereas  non-Keynes- 
ians might  argue that short-run  labor supply elasticities are higher  for 
less skilled persons. In either case, the secular increase in joblessness 
resembles  the change  that  would occur in a typical  recession-in  which 
aggregate  labor  demand  falls-and  recessions are known to have non- 
neutral  effects on various  skill  groups. 
We will not take  a position  on what  is behind  the change  during  reces- 
sions. But whatever  drives cyclical unemployment,  it is different  from 
what has been determining  the long-run  changes  in  jobless time that  we 102  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Figure  7. The Distribution  of Long-run  Changes  in Unemployment 
and Nonparticipation  by Percentiles  of the Wage  Distribution 
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nonparticipation  and unemployment  rates  between  l%7679  and 1987-89  for the indicated  wage  intervals. 
Observe.  We have three reasons  for this view. First, as noted  earlier,  it 
is difficult  to argue that inflexible  wages are important  in the long run, 
especially  since figure  6 demonstrates  substantial  wage  flexibility  among 
the affected  skill  groups.  To attach  a non-market  clearing  interpretation 
to these data,  one must  argue  that  the sharp  decline  in the wages  of low- 
skilled workers  was not enough to clear the market.  Second, high-fre- 
quency fluctuations  in nonemployment  are entirely accounted  for by 
changes  in unemployment.  Our  interest  is in low-frequency  changes,  for 
which  the distributions  of rising  unemployment  and  nonparticipation  are 
nearly  identical  (see figure  7). This  feature  of the data  suggests  that  long- 
term  changes  in nonparticipation  and unemployment  should  have a uni- 
fied explanation,  although  in the short  run  they clearly  do not. 
Finally, although  the least skilled workers have had the worst em- Chinhui  Juhn,  Kevin  M. Murphy,  and  Robert  H. Topel  103 
ployment  experience,  both cyclically  and secularly,  the overall  distribu- 
tion of unemployment  and nonparticipation  has been much more un- 
equal  over the long  run  than  over the typical  cycle. This is demonstrated 
in figure  8. The figure  compares  the distributions  of cyclical changes in 
unemployment  and  nonemployment  with  the distributions  of the secular 
changes  in these variables.  We define  the secular  change  to be the differ- 
ence between 1967-69  and 1987-89.  To calculate  the distribution  of cy- 
clical changes, we average  the changes in joblessness that occurred  in 
the recessions of 1971, 1975, and 1982  for wage deciles in the figure. 
Each bar  in the figure  is expressed relative  to the mean sample  change. 
For example,  workers  in the lowest decile of the wage distribution  expe- 
rienced  a long-term  increase  in unemployment  that  was more  than  three 
times greater  than  the mean sample  increase, but their  cyclical changes 
were only two times greater  than the average  cyclical change  in unem- 
ployment. 
Thus, high-frequency  fluctuations  in unemployment  and nonemploy- 
ment have been more equally distributed  than low-frequency ones. 
Overall,  the skill  distribution  of risking  long-run  unemployment  is much 
steeper  than  the cyclical distribution.  This  pattern  is even more  apparent 
for nonemployment-also shown in figure  8-because  there  is no cycli- 
cal component to nonparticipation.  In our view, this and related evi- 
dence on the behavior  of wages undermine  any explanation  of rising  job- 
lessness that  treats  cyclical and secular  changes  as similar  phenomena. 
Increased  Sectoral  Mobility 
An alternative  explanation  for rising unemployment  is based on its 
role in reallocating  workers among activities. Shocks to relative labor 
demand  across sectors may require  more  reallocative  unemployment  in 
some periods  than  in others, so the natural  rate  of unemployment  varies. 
In this vein, David Lilien suggested  that  cyclical and secular  changes  in 
unemployment  may reflect the increased pace of labor reallocation 
among  sectors.29  Note that  to be consistent  with  our  evidence on the du- 
ration  of unemployment,  it must  be true  that sectoral  mobility  is accom- 
plished  through  extraordinarily  long spells. 
Evidence from  an earlier  study by Murphy  and Topel casts doubt  on 
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Figure 8.  The Distribution of Secular and Cyclical Changes in Unemployment 
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Table 6.  Sectoral Mobility and Its Effect on Unemployment, Selected Intervals,  1975-87 
Percent 
1975  1976-81  1982  1983-87 
Workers  who change  industry  7.6  9.3  7.8  8.3 
Share  of unemployment  due to movers  23.9  28.1  23.5  26.3 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from  March  CPS.  Industry  changers  are  defined  as persons  who  report  that  industry 
affiliation  in the survey  week is different  from  the industry  affiliation  of the longest-held  job in the previous  calendar 
year. 
the sectoral mobility  hypothesis.30  That study showed that the pace of 
sectoral mobility of workers had actually declined during  the period 
when unemployment  was rising  and  that sectoral  mobility  rates  are pro- 
cyclical. It also found that workers  who changed industry  account for 
a minor  and virtually  constant amount  of unemployment.  Persons who 
remain  in an industry  account  for most of the change  in unemployment 
during  the 1970s  and 1980s.  Table  6 shows rates  of sectoral  mobility  and 
the portion  of unemployment  accounted  for by industry  "movers"  dur- 
ing the post-1975  period. Estimated  sectoral  mobility  is lowest in the re- 
cessions of 1975  and 1982,  and  it is slightly  lower in the 1980s  than  in the 
1970s.  The share of movers in total unemployment  is also lower in pe- 
riods  of high  unemployment. 
We extend this evidence by examining  the distribution  of sectoral 
mobility  among  skill categories of workers. Basically, we ask whether 
groups that have experienced rising unemployment  also experienced 
greater  mobility  among  sectors and  whether  sectoral  movers  account  for 
an important  component  of unemployment.  To implement  this idea, we 
exploit a special  feature  of the CPS data. After 1969,  respondents  in the 
March  CPS are asked questions that identify  their  current  two-digit  in- 
dustry.  They are also asked if their  principal  employer  during  the previ- 
ous calendar  year was different  from  their  current  one. We measure  the 
sectoral  mobility  rate as the proportion  of workers  who have moved to 
a different  two-digit  industry. 
Figure  9 compares  the skill distributions  of sectoral mobility  for the 
1972-73 period, the recession of 1982-83, and the 1987-88 period. In 
each period, less skilled individuals-who are more likely to be unem- 
ployed-account  for a disproportionate  share  of overall  sectoral  mobil- 
ity. More interesting,  the distributions  are virtually  identical  across the 
30.  Murphy and Topel (1987). 106  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
Figure  9. Relative  Industrial  Mobility  Rates  by Percentiles  of the Wage  Distribution: 
1972-73, 1982-83,  and 1987-88 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  from March  CPS.  See table  6 for definition  of industrial  mobility.  Estimates  are 
expressed  relative  to the average  mobility  rate for all percentiles  for the specified  time period.  Data after 1988  and 
before 1972  are not comparable  to other  years. 
three  periods.  There  is no evidence that  less skilled  individuals,  who ac- 
count for a larger  share  of changes  in unemployment,  have greater  rela- 
tive mobility during high unemployment periods. This evidence is 
reinforced  in figure 10, which shows the relative share of total unem- 
ployment  by skill category  that is accounted  for by those who changed 
industries.  If sectoral  mobility  of the unemployed  is a determinant  of ris- 
ing unemployment,  the share of unemployment  accounted for by less 
skilled movers should  rise when unemployment  increases. It does not. 
Overall,  we have been unable  to find  any evidence to support  the sec- 
toral  mobility  theory  of a changing  natural  rate. 
Female  Participation  and Other Income 
Up to this point, we have ignored  sources of income other than the 
hourly  wage. Other  sources, however, can be important  for at least two 
reasons. First, since both  the wages and  the work  of low-wage  men  have Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel  107 
Figure  10. Relative  Shares  of Unemployment  Resulting  from Industry  Changers 
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Source: See table 6 and figure  9. The estimates  show the share  of unemployment  due to industry  changes  in a 
percentile  category  relative  to the share  of unemployment  due to industry  changes  in the population  as a whole. 
declined sharply,  it is reasonable  to ask how they survive. Second, in- 
creases in income  from  sources other  than  men's earnings  could reduce 
their  labor  supply. Since female  labor  market  participation  and  earnings 
rose dramatically  during  the period we study, it is plausible  that male 
labor supply could fall because of optimizing  behavior within house- 
holds. It seems reasonable  that these changes could have a dispropor- 
tionate  effect on low-wage  men. 
Table  7 documents  trends  in living  arrangements,  household  income, 
and employment  status  for men. A key point in the table is that the dis- 
tinguishing  characteristic  of jobless spells is their length, not whether 
they are called unemployment  or nonparticipation.  For example, in the 
1967-69  period  roughly  three-fourths  of men with short  unemployment 
spells (less than  26 weeks) resided  with  their  wives. That  figure  fell to 61 
percent by 1989. The corresponding  percentages for men with short 
spells of nonparticipation  are nearly identical. By contrast, men with 
long jobless spells-either  of unemployment  or nonparticipation-are 108  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table 7.  Living Arrangements and Household Income by Employment Status, 
Selected Intervals, 1967-89 
Percent, unless otherwise  noted 
Male employment  Period 
status  Living with  1967-69  1977-79  1987-89 
Full-year  employed  Wife  86.1  79.4  72.4 
Other  family  8.3  9.4  11.8 
Nonfamily  5.7  11.2  15.8 
Household 
income (1982  dollars)  29,142  33,274  37,213 
Short-term  Wife  77.3  65.9  61.2 
unemployed  Other  family  16.0  18.8  20.3 
Nonfamily  6.7  15.3  18.6 
Household 
income (1982  dollars)  22,280  24,788  26,032 
Short-term  Wife  77.8  67.6  61.4 
nonparticipants  Other  family  13.6  15.1  18.1 
Nonfamily  8.6  17.3  20.5 
Household 
income (1982  dollars)  24,986  28,288  30,787 
Long-term  Wife  48.2  48.7  49.2 
unemployed  Other  family  41.3  35.9  33.0 
Nonfamily  10.5  15.4  17.8 
Household 
income (1982  dollars)  17,268  19,274  18,289 
Long-term  Wife  46.7  43.5  41.0 
nonparticipants  Other  family  42.1  40.5  39.0 
Nonfamily  11.2  16.0  20.0 
Household 
income (1982  dollars)  16,432  17,500  17,534 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from March CPS.  The full-year employed  worked  for more than 50 weeks  during 
the  calendar  year.  The  short-term unemployed  worked  more  than 26 weeks  and were  unemployed  most  of  their 
nonworking weeks.  The long-term unemployed  worked fewer than 26 weeks  and were unemployed  for most of their 
nonworking  weeks.  Short-term  and  long-term  nonparticipants  are  classified  like  the  short-term  and  long-term 
unemployed.  Household  income  is deflated by the PCE deflator. 
much  less likely to live with a spouse; the data suggest  that  they rely on 
other  family  members  for support. 
Despite declining  real wages, the table indicates that the household 
incomes and living arrangements  of the long-term  unemployed have 
been stable  over time. As a group,  they have not become poorer,  though 
their  real  household  incomes did not keep pace with the general  popula- Chinhui  Juhn,  Kevin  M. Murphy,  and  Robert  H. Topel  109 
tion. However, our  previous  evidence implies  that  there  are many  more 
of them  today;  the relative  frequency  of single,  jobless men who rely on 
their  families  for support  has risen  through  time. 
Despite relatively  stable incomes among  the long-term  unemployed, 
trends  in nonwage  income  might  favor  low-wage  households.  For exam- 
ple, the labor supply of less skilled men might decline if women's in- 
creased labor force participation  occurred mainly  in low-wage house- 
holds. Table 8 summarizes  changes in female labor  force participation 
and household  incomes for illustrative  portions  of the male  wage distri- 
bution. On average, men experienced zero real earnings growth be- 
tween 1967-69  and 1987-89,  a period  when women's labor  force partici- 
pation  increased  by more than 21 percent and male income from other 
sources  grew  by nearly  84 percent.  These changes  could  plausibly  affect 
men's labor  supply. Yet the table also shows that  the largest  changes  in 
income and female participation  occurred in the households of high- 
wage men. In 1967, women in high-wage  households (those above the 
60th  percentile)  were substantially  less likely than others to participate 
in the labor  market.  Consequently,  income from sources other than the 
male's  earnings  was lowest in these households. Over  the next 20 years, 
the participation  of women in high-wage  households  grew by more  than 
30 percent-more than in any other group.  Accordingly,  incomes grew 
more  rapidly  in high-wage  households  than in low-wage ones. By 1989, 
income  from  sources  other  than  the male's earnings  was highest  in these 
households.31 
These findings  do not rule out supply shifts as a partial  explanation 
for rising  joblessness. The labor supply of low-wage men may be more 
responsive to the changes in female labor  force participation  and other 
income, and there may be other factors that affect work incentives for 
low-wage workers.32  Indeed, the cross-sectional relationship  between 
31. In passing,  we note that  the patterns  in table  8 imply  that  female  earnings  and  par- 
ticipation  have increased  household  income inequality,  reinforcing  the effects of rising 
wage  inequality  among  men. 
32. Several  authors  (Parsons,  1980;  Bound, 1989;  Bound  and Waidmann,  1991)  have 
studied  the role of disability  insurance  (DI). Bound  and  Waidmann  document  the liberal- 
ization  of DI that  occurred  in the early 1970s,  as well as the retrenchment  that  followed. 
For workers  aged 45 and above, they conclude that "earlier  accommodation"  of health 
problems,  resulting  from  the availability  of benefits,  might  explain  as much  as 80 percent 
of the decline  in labor  force participation  among  those aged  45-54 during  the 1970s.  These 
conclusions  are consistent  with  our  results, since availability  of DI may  be one of the fac- ~00~0  er~aONC  0\-  0  000  C;e- 
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Figure  11. Empirical  Relationship  between  Wages  and Time Worked,  1967-69, 
1972-73,  and 1987-89 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  from  March  CPS.  The figure  shows  average  weeks worked  and  experience-adjusted 
wages  for each decile of the wage  distribution  during  the three  indicated  periods. 
wages and work did shift during  the period  we analyze. Figure 11  plots 
the relationship  between wages and weeks worked during  three repre- 
sentative  periods. In the late 1960s,  workers  at all but the lowest wage 
rates were tightly bunched around  full-time work. Then, in the early 
1970s,  the low-wage  end of this relationship  shifted  sharply  to the left.33 
Since then, the cross-sectional relation  between wages and work has 
been remarkably  stable-the  curves for 1972-73  and 1987-89  are nearly 
tors that shifts  the relationship  between  wages and work in figure  11, while also making 
labor  supply  more  elastic. An explanation  based  on DI is more  problematic  in the 1980s, 
however.  We have shown  that  permanent  withdrawal  from  the labor  force became  much 
more  important  during  the 1980s,  a period  of tightened  eligibility  rules  in DI programs  and 
slight  declines  in reported  disability. 
33. This  shift  is implied  by our  earlier  evidence  that  wages  of less skilled  workers  were 
rising  in the late 1960s,  while their weeks worked  were falling.  The long-term  decline in 
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indistinguishable.  Curves  for other  post-1970  periods  are  basically  iden- 
tical to those shown. 
If we interpret  the curves in figure  11 as representing  individuals'  la- 
bor supply, the supply curve has been relatively stable since the early 
1970s, while wages and work among the less skilled have steadily de- 
clined.  The next section  builds  on this  point, treating  the increase  in non- 
employment  as a labor  supply  response to declining  real  wages. 
Wage Flexibility and Nonemployment 
This section tests the idea that the distribution  of long-run  changes 
in unemployment,  nonparticipation,  and nonemployment  can be ex- 
plained  by conformable  long-run  changes  in the returns  to work. We are 
motivated  by several  pieces of evidence. First, figure  6 has shown that 
wages are clearly  flexible  in the longer  run  and  that  they have fallen sub- 
stantially  among  less skilled workers. Second, figure  5 has shown that 
rising  joblessness has been confined almost entirely to the lower skill 
groups.  Third,  figure  11  has shown that  the relationship  of wages to an- 
nual time worked has been stable since 1970, yet we know that both 
wages and  weeks worked  were falling  over this period. Finally,  we have 
seen that  long-term  changes  in unemployment  and nonparticipation  are 
similarly  distributed  across skill groups  and that unemployed  and non- 
employed  persons  are  largely  indistinguishable  from  each other. 
The last point suggests that the most important  variable  in the long 
run  may simply  be nonworking  time, rather  than  its components,  unem- 
ployment  and  nonparticipation.  Since our  working  hypothesis  is that  la- 
bor markets  clear in the long run, we are testing  the idea that  labor  sup- 
ply responses to changing wages are large enough to explain rising 
joblessness among  adult  men. We will shortly  return  to the distinction 
between nonparticipation  and unemployment,  but for now we consider 
a simple  labor  supply  model: 
(5)  eit =  ,io +  r3jilwit  +  Vit, 
where eit  =  1 -  uit  -  oit is the percentage  of year t spent working  by 
persons in skill group  i, wit  is the average  log wage of that  group, Pi  I  is a 
coefficient,  and  vit  is the residual.  Our  interest  is in estimating  the param- 
eter i,, which  represents  the responsiveness  of time  worked  to changes 
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Table 9.  Estimated Partial Elasticities of Labor Supply by Percentiles of the Wage 
Distribution, 1970-89 
Cross-  Estimates  from regional  Cross- 
~~regressions  Wage  section 
percentiles  estimates  OLS  IV 
1-10  0.299  0.289  0.350 
(4.43)  (4.31) 
11-20  0.232  0.251  0.252 
(4.83)  (4.53) 
21-40  0.186  0.146  0.151 
(3.63)  (3.56) 
41-60  0.139  0.058  0.064 
(1.53)  (1.60) 
61-100  0.062  0.047  0.072 
(1.41)  (2.02) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from March  CPS. In all regressions  the dependent  variable  is the fraction  of the 
year  worked.  IV estimates  use region-specific  linear,  quadratic,  and  cubic  trends  as instruments  for wages.  Regional 
regressions  include  region-  and  time-specific  dummy  variables.  Cross-section  estimates  represent  the slope  of a fitted 
quadratic  relationship  between  log wages and the percentage  of the year worked,  evaluated  at the mean  log wage 
with  each interval  of the wage  distribution.  The numbers  in parenthesis  are t-statistics. 
counting  exercise to determine  the proportion  of long-term  changes in 
nonwork  that  is accounted  for by stable  labor  supply  responses. 
Table  9 shows estimates  of P,f3  derived  three  ways. The cross-section 
estimates are based on the assumption  that the relationship  between 
wages and time worked  was stable over the entire  post-1970  period, as 
argued  above. We simply  fit  a quadratic  to the cross-sectional  labor  sup- 
ply function;  the table reports  the average  estimated  partial  elasticities 
for each interval  of the wage distribution.34  As implied  by the preceding 
figures,  partial  elasticities of labor supply are much higher  among  low- 
wage workers.  In itself this is not surprising:  variation  in employment  is 
caused by changes in weeks worked, and high-wage individuals  are 
more  likely to work  a full year. 
The  implied  long-run  elasticities  of labor  supply  from  this  exercise are 
large  compared  with those reported  in the labor  supply  literature.35  For 
example, the point estimate  of 0.299 for men in the lowest decile of the 
34. That  is, we fit a regression  of the form  ei =  Ot +  o1wi  +  o2w I  +  Ei to cell data  on 
average  time  worked  (ei)  and  log wages (wi)  for separate  intervals  of the wage  distribution 
(i) in the post-1970  period.  Then, ,Bij  = &1  + 2&2wi.  More sophisticated  methods  do not 
affect  the results. 
35. See Pencavel  (1986)  for a survey  of the male  labor  supply  literature.  A consensus 
estimate  of the uncompensated  elasticity  of labor  supply  from  that  literature  might  be 0. 1, 
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wage distribution  implies an uncompensated  supply elasticity of 0.40 
(evaluated  at the mean employment  rate), though  estimated  elasticities 
are substantially  lower at higher  wages. 
There are four main reasons why our estimates exceed those in the 
labor supply literature.  First, we allocate wage levels for nonworkers 
using the distribution  of observed wages among those who work few 
weeks. All labor supply studies that we are aware of either  delete non- 
workers  completely  or impute  wages from  working  individuals  with sim- 
ilar characteristics.36  Our evidence indicates that nonworkers are 
mainly  less skilled and that their wages have fallen over time. Second, 
our data indicate  that labor supply elasticities  have increased  since the 
late 1960s, when many of the survey data used in labor supply studies 
were generated. Third, our corrections for errors in measured  wages 
suggest that many  low-wage  workers  who show few weeks worked are 
misclassified  as high wage. As figure  4 showed, we attribute  the back- 
ward-bending  component  of the cross-sectional labor supply curve to 
these errors;  thus  our  corrections  enhance  the estimated  responsiveness 
of labor  supply.  Finally,  our  estimates  are  based on the raw  relationship 
between wages and work. We do not follow the traditional  practice of 
controlling  for education,  marital  status, or other  observables  that  raise 
wages and are also associated with greater  labor supply. In effect, we 
assume  that  more  educated  persons  work  more  because they earn  higher 
wages. Given the fact that wages and labor supply are measured  with 
error,  we think  this approach  increases the signal-to-noise  ratio  in esti- 
mating  labor  supply  responses. 
An alternative  (and  independent)  source  of information  on labor  sup- 
ply responses to changing  real wages is generated  by the large differ- 
ences in regional  labor  market  performance  that occurred  in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  The relatively  smooth  long-term  changes  in aggregate  wages 
and employment  mask large medium-frequency  changes in these vari- 
ables across regional  labor  markets. 
Figure 12 documents these changes for six regional aggregates. In 
constructing  the figure, we projected  regional  log wages and employ- 
ment  rates  on fixed  effects for each region  and  a vector of year  dummies, 
meant  to control  for aggregate  fluctuations.  The  figure  plots the residuals 
36. As Pencavel  (1986)  notes, these strategies  yield similar  results:  "I  know  of no evi- 
dence . . .that documents  grievous  biases from  a strategy  of restricting  estimation  to the 
sample  of workers...."  Ignoring  nonworkers  would  make  a difference  in our  analysis. Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel  115 
from  these regressions  for each region.  Thus the figures  show within-re- 
gion  changes  in employment  rates  and  wages that  exclude economywide 
fluctuations  in these variables. Any nonneutral  effect of the business 
cycles across regions  will show up in these series. 
There are two noteworthy  points about the figure.  First, for low- to 
medium-frequency  changes, regional wages and employment rates 
move together. For example, wages and employment  in New England 
declined through  the mid-1970s,  but a sustained  boom followed which 
generated  both  rising  employment  rates and  rising  wages. Between 1979 
and 1989, relative wages in New England  rose by 12 percent. At the 
other extreme, labor markets in the Southwest (West South Central) 
softened in the  1980s, leading to declining employment and falling 
wages. These regional figures clearly show very substantial  long-run 
wage flexibility, supporting  our earlier  conclusions based on aggregate 
wage changes. 
The second point about  the figure  is timing.  Although  wages and em- 
ployment  rates move together  over the longer term, the turning  points 
in the series  do not coincide. For  example,  measured  in terms  of employ- 
ment rates, New England's  turnaround  began after the 1975  recession, 
but relative wages did not start to climb until 1979. In the Midwest 
(North  Central),  employment  rates  fell sharply  in the late 1970s  and  then 
stabilized  in the 1980s.  Wage  rates fell more smoothly. Similar  patterns 
emerge  in the Middle  Atlantic  states and  in the Southwest. In each case, 
it appears  that changes in labor demand  led to employment  responses, 
which were then followed by changing wages over the longer term. 
Those who believe that  wages do not adjust  completely  in the short  run 
can find  comfort  in these data. 
In light of these regional  data, table 9 reports  ordinary  least squares 
(OLS)  estimates  of j3i1  from  models of the form 
(6)  eirt -3ir  +  Ait +  IilWirt  +  Virt 
where  eir, is the employment  rate  of persons  in skill  group  i, region  r, and 
year t; 13ir  is a fixed region  effect for persons in skill group  i; and the Ait 
are year effects that  control  for the effect of aggregate  fluctuations. 
Notice that the experiment  underlying  the estimation  of O1il  in equa- 
tion 6 differs  from our method  of deriving  these effects from the cross- 
sectional relationship  of wages and work. As in equation  5, we assume 
that fluctuations  in wages and time worked are driven  by demand.  But 116  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.:1991 
Figure 12.  Regional Variations in Relative Wages and Employment Rates,  1967-89 
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since equation  6 controls both regional  and time effects for each skill 
group, we estimate labor supply responses from relative wage fluctua- 
tions across regions. In effect, we ask whether  a region-specific  decline 
in the relative  wage of skill  group  i causes a conformable  region-specific 
change  in the relative  labor  supply  of that  group. 
The surprising  result is that the labor supply responses estimated 
from  regional  data  are  nearly  identical  to those estimated  from  the cross- 
sectional relationship  between wages and time worked. The estimated 
partial  elasticity  for the lowest skill  category  is within  1  percentage  point 
(0.289 versus 0.299) of the cross-sectional estimate, with correspond- 
ingly smaller  responses at higher  intervals  of the wage distribution.  As 
in the cross section, all of the estimated  effects are positive.37 
Despite this similarity,  we were concerned that sampling  error in 
measured wages-generated  by relatively small regional samples- 
could seriously affect the regional  estimates. As previous figures sug- 
gest, the wage changes that affect long-term  changes in employment 
rates  occur at fairly  low frequency.  Thus, table  9 also reports  results  us- 
ing region-specific  and skill group-specific  trends  as instruments  for re- 
gional  wages. Evidently, sampling  error  is not a major  concern. The in- 
strumental  variables  (IV) estimates  are close to both the OLS estimates 
and  the cross-sectional  estimates. 
The estimates in table 9 are derived from two conceptually  distinct 
experiments, so their similarity  is encouraging.  Yet even if these esti- 
mates represent  true  labor  supply  responses to changing  wages, it does 
not follow that observed increases in unemployment  and nonparticipa- 
tion are wage determined.  We need to show how much  of the overall  de- 
cline in jobless time is consistent with a model of declining  wages and 
stable  labor  supply. 
Table 10  compares  actual  changes  in nonemployment  and  its compo- 
nents to predicted  changes derived  from the estimates in table 9 for the 
nonemployed and from comparable regressions for the component 
groups. Labor  supply  estimates  for the unemployed  and  for nonpartici- 
37. Some  readers  may  be concerned  that  our  imputation  procedures  cause an upward 
bias in estimated  labor supply  responses, because nonworkers  are imputed  low wages. 
Thus,  when  the number  of nonworkers  rises, average  wages  may  fall. To test for  this  effect 
we reestimated  the model  using  only workers  with positive weeks worked  in the calcula- 
tion of wages. The estimated  partial  elasticities  for this procedure  are, by wage interval, 
0.264,  0.250,  0.144,  0.060, and  0.049.  These  are  nearly  identical  to the estimates  in table  9. Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel  119 
Table 10. Actual  and Predicted  Changes  in Male  Nonemployment  Rates  by Percentiles 
of the Wage  Distribution,  1972-73  through  1987-89 
Percent 
Type  of  Predicted  change 
worker 
and wage  Actual  Cross-  OLS  for  IV for 
percentiles  change  section  regions  regions 
Nonemployed 
0-10  9.3  10.3  8.5  8.8 
11-20  4.9  6.2  6.1  5.7 
21-40  3.2  2.7  2.6  3.3 
41-60  0.8  0.7  0.6  1.5 
61-100  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Total  2.3  2.4  2.1  2.5 
Unemployed 
0-10  2.7  6.5  4.8  3.8 
11-20  1.6  3.5  3.3  2.5 
21-40  1.2  1.6  1.5  1.5 
41-60  0.2  0.6  0.5  0.7 
61-100  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Total  0.7  1.5  1.2  1.1 
Nonparticipating 
0-10  6.5  3.8  3.7  5.0 
11-20  3.3  2.7  2.9  3.2 
21-40  2.0  1.1  1.1  1.8 
41-60  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.8 
61-100  0.2  0.0  0.0  1.1 
Total  1.6  0.9  0.9  1.4 
Source: See table  9. Predicted  changes  for nonemployment  are generated  by the models  that  are summarized  in 
table  9. We performed  identical  calculations  for unemployment  and  nonparticipation  taken  separately,  but we do not 
report  the underlying  parameter  estimates. 
pants were derived by the same methods described  above; we do not 
present  the detailed  estimates, however. Since our estimates  of supply 
responses are based on the relationship  of work to wages in the post- 
1970  period,  we measure  changes  relative  to the 1972-73  period,  the first 
nonrecessionary  years of the period. The ending  period  is 1987-89, the 
end of the most recent expansion. Our  results are not substantially  dif- 
ferent  for other  periods. 
Between 1972-73 and 1987-89, the actual nonemployment  rate of 
prime-aged  men rose by 2.3 percentage  points. Using supply  responses 
calculated from the cross-sectional relationship of  wages and time 
worked, we predict  a 2.4 percentage  point increase in nonemployment 
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derived  from  regional  data, our  predictions  are 2.1 points (the OLS esti- 
mate)  and 2.5 points (the IV estimate). In short, our overall  predictions 
of rising  joblessness are not wide of the mark. 
A more  telling  finding  is that  wage changes  accurately  predict  the dis- 
tribution of rising  joblessness. All three models predict  that the largest 
increase  in the nonemployment  rate  will occur  at the low end of the wage 
distribution-where wages declined  the most and supply  responses are 
largest-while predicted  employment  rates  of highly  skilled  workers  are 
unchanged. 
Table 10 also shows corresponding  results for unemployment  and 
nonparticipation.  The main finding  here is that we slightly  overpredict 
the long-run  increase in the unemployment  rate, and we underpredict 
the increase  in nonparticipation.  This  pattern  occurs in every skill  group 
but is most pronounced among less skilled workers. Thus, long-run 
wage changes are useful in distinguishing  work from nonwork,  but the 
distinction between demand-induced  changes in unemployment  and 
nonparticipation  is more  elusive. 
None of this implies  that  the distinction  between unemployment  and 
nonparticipation  is meaningless  or arbitrary.  The unemployed  are ac- 
tively looking  for work at some wage, and nonparticipants  are not. But 
labor  supply  considerations  imply  that the incentive to be in these cate- 
gories is affected by the returns  to work, and our analysis shows that 
these returns have fallen dramatically.  In this sense, the long-term 
change in nonemployment  is a better indicator  of overall labor market 
performance  than  either  of its components. 
There  is still information  to be gleaned  from  unemployment  and  non- 
participation,  however. Our previous results indicated that cyclical 
fluctuations  in labor  demand  had no effect on nonparticipation  rates of 
prime-aged  men, implying that discouraged-worker  effects are unim- 
portant  in the short  run. Figure 13 suggests the opposite conclusion for 
longer-run  changes. For intervals  of the wage distribution,  the figure  de- 
composes changes  in unemployment  rates  into changes  in nonparticipa- 
tion and changes in employment.  We gauge these changes over a five- 
year period  of aggregate  recovery, from the recession of 1982-83  to the 
end of our data  in 1987-89.  For workers  in the lowest decile of the wage 
distribution,  less than  half  of the 8 percentage  point  decline  in the unem- 
ployment rate is accounted for by rising employment. Many of them Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel  121 
Figure  13. Changes  in Nonparticipation  and Employment  Rates  by Percentiles 
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simply  leave the labor  market,  suggesting  the importance  of longer-run 
discouraged-worker  effects among  the less skilled.  By contrast,  workers 
who command  higher  wages returned  to work after  the recession; their 
changes  in nonparticipation  are small. 
The Extent of Wage Flexibility 
Macroeconomic  evidence on the extent and  importance  of wage flex- 
ibility is usually based on published  data on average hourly wages or 
some other index of compensation.  Even in studies that use microdata 
on individuals'  wages, a common strategy  is to form  an aggregate  wage 
index by dividing  aggregate  compensation  by aggregate  hours.38  In ag- 
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gregate  data,  this wage index  is simply  total  compensation  of all employ- 
ees divided  by total hours  worked  during  the year: 
_  I  WjHj  Hj 
(7)  WA==  E  W H 
Hj 
where H =  I  Hj is aggregate  hours  of all  j workers. The implication  of 
equation  7 is that  average  hourly  compensation  is a weighted  average  of 
individual  wages in which  persons  who work  more  hours  receive greater 
weight. One problem  with this index is that changes in the distribution 
of hours worked cause changes in the calculated  average  wage even if 
individual  wages do not change. Even when such composition  changes 
do not occur, percent changes in equation 7 over time give greater 
weight  to high-wage  persons and  to those who work  more  hours: 
(8)  dWA =  dW  W. H 
WA  'j  WAH 
We can compare  this index  with some alternative  measures  of wages. 
According  to figures  4 and 6, persons with high wages and hours are 
those with the smallest proportional  changes in wages. Thus propor- 
tional changes in the aggregate  wage will understate the percentage 
change  in an average  of individual wages given by 
(9)dW  1  dWW 
N  NE  Wj WI  WI  =  WJW 
Even equation  9 gives disproportionate  weight  to high-wage  persons,  for 
whom percentage  changes in wages were smallest  during  the period of 
our data. By contrast, changes in the average  of log wages provide an 
unweighted  average  of percentage  changes  in wages: 
1dW. 
(10)  d(log W) =-  ' 
The upper three curves in figure 14 show wage indexes calculated 
from average hourly wages, the average across individuals  of hourly 
wages, and the average across individuals  of log wages. As expected, 
the first  method  shows the least evidence of secular  wage  flexibility,  and 
the third  method  shows the most. By 1989,  average  hourly  wages based 
on equation  9-which  gives greater  weight  to high-wage  persons-were Chinhui  Juhn, Kevin  M. Murphy,  and  Robert  H. Topel  123 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  from March CPS.  See  the text for a detailed  description  of the calculations.  Each 
wage measure is expressed  as an index,  with  1970 =  100. 
about 3 percent below their 1970  level. By contrast,  the average  of log 
wages-for  which changes are equivalent to unweighted percentage 
changes  in wages-had  declined  by about  9 percent. Since studies  of ag- 
gregate  labor  supply  try to isolate the work  incentives  facing  the typical 
worker, this means that aggregate  wage data substantially  understate 
the amount  of wage flexibility  that has affected those incentives. They 
therefore overstate the elasticity of labor supply that is necessary to 
make wage and employment  data conform  to a market-clearing  model. 
Notice that  it is necessary  to use microdata  on individuals'  wages to ob- 
tain  this result. 
Our  previous  results  indicate  that even the third  method, calculating 
average  log wages, may understate  the extent of relevant wage flexibil- 
ity. Since the labor  supply  functions  that we estimated  are clearly  non- 
linear, changes in average labor supply cannot be determined  from 
changes in average log wages. Instead, the relevant aggregate  index 
should weight individual  wage changes by relative elasticities of labor 
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changes-are  given greater  weight when calculating  the aggregate  in- 
dex. We perform  that  calculation  using  the regional  IV estimates  shown 
in table 9. The result is the lowest curve in figure 14. It shows that the 
wage index  relevant  for  gauging  labor  supply  decisions  fell by 18  percent 
between 1973  and 1989,  with more  than  half  of this decline  concentrated 
in the years between 1977  and 1983. 
To the extent that we have properly  gauged  labor supply, these re- 
sults imply that the use of microdata  is essential to study the role of 
wages and time series changes in labor supply. Usual methods, which 
use aggregate  data  on wages, miss the large  changes  in work incentives 
that have occurred  since 1970. 
Conclusions 
Rising rates of joblessness during  the recent past have presented a 
puzzle for students  of labor market  performance.  Standard  macroeco- 
nomic models, which have focused mainly  on the cyclical behavior  of 
wages and unemployment,  are clearly  inappropriate  for the longer  run, 
when wages are  demonstrably  flexible  and  labor  markets  are  more  likely 
to clear. And extensions of natural-rate  theories that allow changes in 
the pace of labor  reallocation  to affect unemployment  have little or no 
support  in the data. 
We have shown that virtually  all of the trend  toward  rising  male  job- 
lessness in the United States is accounted  for by the rising  unemploy- 
ment and nonparticipation  of less skilled persons. For this group, in- 
creases in nonemployed  weeks are mainly  attributable  to an increase  in 
the incidence  of very long spells of nonwork.  In a reduced-form  sense, 
there is little doubt that rising  unemployment  and nonparticipation  are 
demand  driven. Since the mid-1970s,  wages fell substantially  within  the 
skill  categories  in which employment  declined,  while groups  with stable 
wages had relatively stable employment  rates. We pressed further  by 
asking whether these changes were consistent with a simple market- 
clearing  structure  of stable  labor  supply  and changing  demand.  Early  in 
the period  we consider, it clearly  is not. Wages  and  nonemployment  in- 
creased  together  at the end of the 1960s,  indicating  that  labor  supply  fell 
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groups  appear  to determine  changes  in working  time among  prime-aged 
men. 
In many  interpretations,  the natural  rate of unemployment  is a fixed 
number  toward  which the labor market  tends to gravitate.  Our  results 
challenge that view. Like Phelps' interpretation,  our results indicate 
that the natural  rate varies with labor market  conditions.39  A long-run 
decline  in the demand  for various  types of labor  may  increase  the natural 
rate because the rewards  to employment  decline for marginal  workers. 
Our  results  also imply  that  current  unemployment  rates  have a far  differ- 
ent meaning  than comparable  rates from the not-too-distant  past. The 
composition  of unemployment  has shifted  toward  less skilled  workers, 
who suffer  comparatively  long spells of joblessness and whose rewards 
from  work  have fallen  sharply.  In both  these respects, they resemble  the 
growing class of  men who have simply withdrawn from the labor 
market. 
Our  analysis has focused on reduced  demand  as the factor changing 
the returns  to work. Yet declines in the "quality"  of workers  over time 
could  generate  similar  results. For example,  if more  recent  cohorts  have 
larger  proportions  of low-productivity  workers,  perhaps  because of the 
declining  quality  of schools, then workers  from these cohorts will face 
lower demand  for their services. The wages they command  will lower, 
and  they will work  less. Two pieces of evidence argue  against  this. First, 
average  schooling  levels have increased  through  time, suggesting  higher 
productivity  for more  recent cohorts. Second, wage inequality  and  job- 
lessness have increased  within  cohorts and at all experience  levels. To 
attribute  these changes to the declining  quality  of the work force, it is 
necessary  for skills to depreciate  within  each cohort. We are not aware 
of any evidence suggesting  that this occurred. 
Even so, a decline in the demand  for less skilled workers  can affect 
the quality  of the work  force. Rising  returns  to skill-especially  obvious 
in the returns  to education  during  the 1980s-increase incentives  for hu- 
man capital  investment.  These incentives would raise the average  pro- 
ductivity  of the work force in the long run. On the other hand, our evi- 
dence shows that  many  workers  with very low skills have either  left the 
labor  force completely  or spent  long  periods  without  jobs. Ifjoblessness 
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itself generates declining  market  skills, either through  depreciation  of 
human  capital  or reduced  on-the-job  training,  then  the effects of reduced 
demand  on work  incentives  will be reinforced.40  As a result, even an in- 
crease in the demand  for less skilled workers  could not quickly repro- 
duce the low jobless rates of the past. Past patterns  of demand  have al- 
tered  the economy's stock of human  capital,  raising  future  natural  rates 
of unemployment  and nonparticipation. 
40. Another  possibility  is that  persistent  joblessness encourages  investment  in "non- 
market"  human  capital,  which  would  cause a shift  in labor  supply.  Our  evidence  that  the 
relationship  of wages to time  worked  has been stable  since the early 1970s  casts doubt  on 
this effect. Comments 
and Discussion 
Janet L. Yellen:  I The authors  have written  an excellent paper.  Chinhui 
Juhn,  Kevin  Murphy,  and  Robert  Topel use 23 years  of records  from  the 
Current  Population  Survey to compile a detailed portrait  of nonwork 
among  men who are not in school and who have 1 to 30 years of work 
experience.  The data  reveal a large  secular  increase  in nonwork,  which 
takes two forms-more  time spent out of the labor  force and more  time 
spent  unemployed.  They show that  most of the increase-both in unem- 
ployment and in nonparticipation-is concentrated  in long spells. In 
data  on work  experience  for the preceding  calendar  year, the increase  in 
nonwork  is largely  accounted  for by a growing  number  of people who 
did  no work  at all. The increase  in nonwork  occurred  almost  exclusively 
among  the low skilled, whose wages simultaneously  declined. The au- 
thors  conclude  that  the movements  in nonwork  represent  a labor  supply 
response, which is  summarized  by their estimates of labor supply 
elasticities.  The labor  supply  response summarized  by these elasticities, 
however, is not consistent with the standard  model of labor supply, in 
which changing  wages marginally  change  the labor  supply  of everyone. 
By contrast,  the authors  document  dramatic  changes  in the labor  supply 
of a few coupled  with no change  in the labor  supply  of the vast majority 
of the population.  The increase  in nonparticipation,  for example, is not 
caused by the majority  of men enjoying, say, 2.7 rather  than  2.3 weeks 
of vacation;  instead,  this trend  is entirely  due to an increasing  number  of 
prime-aged  men who are "consuming  leisure"  for all 52 weeks of the 
year. While  reading  this paper,  I found  myself agreeing  with the authors 
that  the secular  increase  in nonwork  is a labor  supply  response, but was 
1. These comments  were prepared  jointly with  George  Akerlof.  I wish to thank  Jona- 
than  Leonard  for helpful  discussions. 
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also puzzled as to why the response is so extreme  and so concentrated 
among  such a small  minority.  I wish that  the authors  had  reported  more 
detailed  information,  some of which  is available  in the Work  Experience 
Survey,  relating  to such questions  as: What  is the nonwork  these people 
do all day? How important  are government  transfers  in enabling  non- 
workers  to pay for what they eat? What  are the alternative  choices for 
nonworkers  and their  associated  rewards? 
My quibbles  with the authors'  methodology  and  findings  are minor.  I 
believe that they have described  the corpse and provided  a convincing 
autopsy. However, the murderer  remains  at large,  although  some of the 
less  likely suspects (such as more rapid sectoral shifts) have been 
cleared of suspicion. An interpretation  of these facts that goes beyond 
the bland statement  that workers  are moving  along their supply  curves 
is needed to form  judgments  about  the significance  of this phenomenon. 
Among  the usual  suspects are the following:  the destruction  ofjobs pro- 
viding  rents to low-skilled  workers,  who wait for good work  rather  than 
accept  the poorjobs that  are  available;  the rising  availability  of disability 
insurance,  and a greater  willingness  of low-skilled  workers  to withdraw 
from  the labor  force in order  to establish  eligibility;  the increased  earn- 
ings of spouses and other  family members,  which may permit  men who 
are ill or have poor opportunities  to remain  out of work;  and, perhaps, 
an increase in unreported  income from illegal activities. These factors 
may  jointly explain  the increase in long-term  unemployment  as well as 
the declines in labor  force participation  among  low-skilled  men. 
The authors  document  that  the increase  injoblessness of the past two 
decades takes two forms: more spells of long-term  unemployment  and 
more long spells of nonparticipation.  They argue  that, because of their 
similarity,  these two forms of nonwork  can be aggregated  in estimating 
a labor  supply  curve. There  is reason,  however, to question  this  aggrega- 
tion. Individuals  with long-term  unemployment  spells appear  to be de- 
sirous of work. They typically have some work experience during  the 
year; for example, the numbers  in the authors' table 3 show that 75.6 
percent of the increase in long-term unemployment (more than 26 
weeks) from 1967-69  to 1987-89  occurred  among those who had some 
employment  (at least 1 week) during  the year. According  to the Work 
Experience  Survey, inability  to find  work is the major  reason for part- 
year employment.  For example, the Work  Experience Survey of 1988 
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were out of school, and had minimal  weeks of employment  (only 1-13 
weeks) considered  inability  to find  work the major  reason for part-year 
employment.  By contrast,  94.4 percent  of the increase in nonparticipa- 
tion  in spells of more  than  26 weeks occurred  among  individuals  who did 
no work at all during  the year. Although  the authors  emphasize  that an 
increasing share of  these full-year nonparticipants  are discouraged 
workers, a considerable  majority  are ill or disabled. Sixty-nine  percent 
of full-year  nonworkers  aged 16 and older who were neither  in school 
nor retired  (including  not only nonparticipants  but those with some un- 
employment)  gave illness or disability  as the major  reason  for nonwork 
in the 1988 Work Experience Survey. Thus, contrary  to the authors' 
conclusions regarding  the similarity  of the unemployed  and nonpartici- 
pants, there  is reason  to believe that  the two are distinct  populations. 
A simple  explanation  of the increase  in long-term  unemployment  cen- 
ters on the disappearance  of rent-paying  jobs. Lawrence Summers  has 
hypothesized that many of the long-term  unemployed  are individuals 
who were displaced  from "good  jobs" that paid high rents.2  An earlier 
paper  by Murphy  and  Topel showed the extent to which  new entrants  to 
the labor  force are more likely now than in the past to go into service- 
sectorjobs, which  have relatively  low pay, rather  than  into manufactur- 
ing  jobs, with  relatively  high  pay.3 Why should  the decline  in the number 
of rent-paying  jobs in manufacturing  as well as in other  industries  cause 
an increase in unemployment?  When there is wage dispersion, so that 
both good and  bad  jobs are  available  for workers  with  given skills, some 
workers will choose to remain  unemployed, searching  for good, rent- 
paying  jobs, rather  than  work  at the poorjobs that  are readily  available. 
Conceivably,  the long-term  unemployed  would accept bad  jobs if they 
were convinced that no good ones would ever appear;  but as long as 
there  is hope of obtaining  a good  job, as occurs when there  is some turn- 
over in rent-paying  jobs, they may prefer  to wait. A decline  in the avail- 
ability  of such  rent-paying  jobs, as has occurred  in the period  covered  by 
the authors' data, tends to increase long-term  unemployment  because 
people have to wait longer to get good jobs, which are rationed. This 
view of long-term  unemployment  is consistent with the authors'  finding 
that  long-term  unemployment  declines in booming  regions  where  wages 
2.  Summers (1986). 
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are rising. Using similar  regional  data  Summers  found  little relationship 
between changes  in regional  unemployment  rates and regional  employ- 
ment growth  but found a strong  negative relation  between regional  un- 
employment  and  employment  growth  in high-wage  industries  (that  is, in 
those industries  that  pay Krueger-Summers-Dickens-Katz  wage premi- 
ums). In contrast  to the authors'  view that  labor  markets  for low-skilled 
workers are clearing, this explanation  of higher long-term  unemploy- 
ment combines market-clearing  and non-market  clearing  aspects. The 
long-term  unemployed  are searching  for work  for which they are quali- 
fied. In this interpretation,  unemployment  is a response to wage disper- 
sion rather  than to wage levels, contrary  to the authors' labor supply 
function,  in which labor  supply  depends  only  on wage levels. 
Now let me turn  to the reasons for the increase in nonparticipation. 
The evidence in the authors'  table 2 suggests that the rise in long-term 
nonparticipation  among preretirement  males is associated with illness 
and  disability.  Indeed  I was surprised  that  the authors  pay so little  atten- 
tion to the conventional  wisdom4  that the increased  availability  of dis- 
ability  benefits  is responsible  for the secular  increase in the labor  force 
nonparticipation  of prime-aged  males that is documented  in this paper. 
The receipt  of disability  benefits  requires  virtually  complete  withdrawal 
from the labor  force. An individual  is only considered  disabled  if he or 
she is unable  "to engage  in any substantial  gainful  activity by reason of 
any medically  determinable  physical  or mental  impairment  which  can be 
expected to result  in death  or which has lasted  or can be expected to last 
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."5  A worker who 
earns  more  than  $300  per month  is presumed  to be capable  of substantial 
gainful  activity. In addition,  SSI (Supplemental  Security  Income)  bene- 
ficiaries  have a cap on their  income of $4,416  a year. 
A wealth of evidence points to the increase in payments  for illness 
and disability  as the cause for increased nonparticipation  in the labor 
force. These payments explain how those who do no work are able to 
eat. Over the past 25 years there have been vast increases in the scale 
of income support  programs  for the ill and the disabled. For example, 
between 1966 and 1989 the number  of workers under age 50 who re- 
ceived disability  on OASDI (Old  Age Survivors  and Disability  Income) 
4.  See, for example,  Leonard  (1979)  and  Parsons  (1980). 
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Table 1. Average  Number  of Weeks  Spent  by Prime-Aged  Males  in 52-Week  Spells 
of Nonemployment,  by Reason 
Reason  for not working 
Taking  Unable 
Authors'  New  Illness or  care of  to  find  Other 
Period  totala  Period  totalb  disability  home  work  reason 
1967-69  0.91  1968  1.08  0.91  0.00  0.07  0.10 
1977-78  1.79  1978  2.08  1.50  0.06  0.25  0.27 
1987-89  2.36  1988  2.78  1.75  0.12  0.60  0.31 
Source: Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1970,  tables D-2 and A-I), Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1980,  tables  D-2 and 
A-I), and unpublished  data  from  the Work  Experience  Survey  of the Population  in 1988  (Department  of Labor). 
a. The column  shows the average  number  of weeks spent in 52-week  spells of nonwork  per male in the authors' 
sample,  calculated  from  table  3 in their  paper. 
b. The column  shows the average  number  of weeks spent  in 52-week  spells of nonwork  per male  aged  25-54, for 
men who were not in school and  not retired. 
increased  from 213,000  to 745,000. This increase of more than 500,000 
accounts  for almost  half  of the rise  in the time  spent  out of the labor  force 
documented  in tables 1 and 3 of the paper.  The 2.39 percent  increase  in 
the rate of nonparticipation  implies that the number  of nonparticipants 
(at any given time) has increased  by roughly 1.2 million.  In addition  to 
OASDI, there  are other  programs  that  provide  support  to the ill and  dis- 
abled. SSI provided  income for 523,000  disabled  males under  age 54 in 
May 1986. Of these, an estimated 160,000  also collected OASDI and 
hence should not be double counted. The total number  of individuals 
who received SSI as result of disability  rose by 138 percent in the 15 
years from 1974 to  1989. In addition to disability payments under 
OASDI  and  SSI, payments  in compensation  for lost income under  State 
and Federal Workers' Compensation increased 13-fold (in nominal 
terms)  from $1.214  billion  in 1965  to $16.461  billion  in 1986.  As Donald 
Parsons  and Jonathan  Leonard  have both argued,  the close time series 
relation  between the extent of disability  support  and the rate of nonpar- 
ticipation  by prime-aged  males strongly  suggests a causal relationship. 
Moreover,  Parsons  showed that  the recipients  of such support  were pri- 
marily  low-skilled  individuals. 
Furthermore,  individual  responses to questions  in the Work  Experi- 
ence Survey are consistent with the view that a large fraction  of labor 
force withdrawal  is due to illness or disability.  My table I presents  a de- 
composition  of the reasons  for nonwork  of prime-aged  males (who were 
out of school and nonretired)  who did no work  in the previous  calendar 
year. The numbers  show the average  number  of weeks not worked  per 
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Data are presented  for three years. For their sample,  the authors  found 
that the average  number  of weeks of nonwork  in 52-week spells had in- 
creased from  0.905 in 1967-69  to 1.788  in 1977-78  and to 2.364 in 1987- 
89. (Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Topel's numbers,  which  can be calculated  from 
their table 3, are shown in the second column of my table.) For my 
slightly different  sample, of 25- to 54-year-old  males, I found a similar 
increase, from 1.08  weeks in 1968  to 2.08 weeks in 1978  to 2.78 weeks in 
1988.  Of the 1.7 week increase  between 1968  and 1988,  49.4 percent  was 
accounted  for by increases in illness and disability;  31.2 percent  by in- 
creased  inability  to find  work;  7.1 percent  by increased  taking  care  of the 
home; and 12.4 percent was due to other reasons. This table supports 
the authors'  contention  that  in the 1980s  less of the increase  in nonpartic- 
ipation  is explained  by disability  than was explained  in the 1970s,  pre- 
sumably because of the tightened eligibility  rules for disability  insur- 
ance. Indeed  these differences  between the 1970s  and 1980s  support  the 
view that nonparticipation  is affected  by disability  incentives. Thus the 
increased availability  of disability  payments over the whole period, in 
all likelihood, accounts for a significant  part of the increase in nonpar- 
ticipation. 
In sum, the reported  reasons for increases in nonwork  in the Work 
Experience Survey support the conventional view that a variety of 
transfer  programs  underlie  the increased nonparticipation  of younger 
men. The authors  point to the finding  in their  table 2 that the fraction  of 
nonparticipants  who could not find  work had increased  over time; they 
fail to remark  that  about  half  of the increase  in nonparticipation  was due 
to increasing  numbers  of those reported  ill or disabled. 
Does all of this agree  with  the authors'  interpretation  that  the increase 
in nonwork  is a labor supply response to declining  wages? I have no 
quarrel  with  the idea that  "illness"  is an occupation-for many,  an occu- 
pation of necessity, but for others an occupation  of choice when other 
opportunities  are quite  poor. Thus I would not be surprised  to find  that 
when wages get worse (as they did for low-skilled  people over the past 
20 years), many people, who may have serious medical  problems,  be- 
come not  just sick but sick of work. Nor is it surprising  that  when times 
get better, so that opportunities  improve, as they did in the Massachu- 
setts miracle,  fewer people took this option. This provides  a reasonable 
interpretation  of the authors'  "labor  supply  curve."  It also explains  their 
remarkable  finding  that  all of the increase  in nonparticipation  is concen- Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel  133 
trated  in 52-week  spells. However, the  jury is still out on the question  of 
whether  the increase  in disability  reflects  shifts  of the labor  supply  curve 
of disabled  individuals  or movements along their labor supply curves. 
The beginning  of the authors'  sample  period  coincided  with a consider- 
able loosening of the eligibility requirements  for disability including 
looser definitions  of disability.6  Finally, the authors'  table 8 shows that 
among  the bottom  decile of men, the labor  force participation  of spouses 
has not increased  significantly.  But income  from  other  sources, from  in- 
creased transfer  payments  or perhaps  higher  earnings  of female family 
members, has increased by 50 percent. This increased income from 
other  sources may  have allowed  men  the luxury  of being  out of the labor 
force  when sick or disabled  or of being  among  the long-term  unemployed 
when displaced  from  rent-paying  jobs. 
My major  technical  quibble  concerns the authors'  estimates  of labor 
supply elasticities, which are higher than those usually obtained. My 
previous comments suggest that these elasticities are biased upward. 
Consider  the cross-section estimates:  I have argued  that low-wage  peo- 
ple are disproportionately  sick people; these individuals  work less than 
others  in part  because they are less healthy, not only because they have 
lower wages. The regional  regressions  may overstate  labor  supply  elas- 
ticities for a different  reason: as times get better, not only do wages 
change, but good jobs, which attract people into work, also become 
more plentiful. This reduction  in rationing,  as well as the increase in 
wages, may account for the cross-regional  employment  responses ob- 
served  by the authors. 
Martin Neil Baily: This is a first-rate  paper. The story that Chinhui 
Juhn, Kevin Murphy,  and Robert  Topel tell is a very convincing  one. 
The demand  for low-skilled  workers  has declined,  thereby  lowering  the 
relative  wage of this population  group.  The workers  at the bottom  of the 
skill distribution  have responded by reducing their labor supply. In 
many cases this has meant dropping  out of the labor force altogether. 
The data  do not fit  the alternative  hypothesis  that  labor  supply  alone  has 
shifted. For example, if the driving  force behind  the change  in the natu- 
ral rate of unemployment  had been an increase in the availability  of 
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transfers,  the relative  wage of the people at the bottom  would  have risen 
as their  supply  was reduced.  Yet we have seen a decrease. 
If one worked hard enough, it might  be possible to explain the ob- 
served  pattern  on the basis of a decline  in labor  quality  at the lowest end 
of skill distribution.  This could simultaneously  lower the relative  wage 
of this group  and lower its labor  force participation.  But this alternative 
is not convincing  because the widening  of the wage distribution  has oc- 
curred  not  just at its lower end or in the distribution  for young  people. It 
affects other  quintiles  and  cohorts. Within  any demographic  group,  one 
sees the same patterns.  Thus, it is very hard  to tell a coherent  story that 
does not involve some substantial  shift  in labor  demand. 
Having  said  that  I think  the overall  story  is convincing,  let me at least 
voice some reservations  about the details. First, I was troubled  by the 
authors'  assumption  that  skill  can be measured  by percentile  of the wage 
distribution.  There  are, after  all, independent  measures  of skill, educa- 
tion, and experience. The price of the skill and the skill  itself are differ- 
ent things, and I would like to have seen these factors separated  out or 
the authors  give a little more  justification  for their  procedure. 
Second, figure 6 shows that during  the early period, from 1967 to 
1970,  workers  in the bottom  decile actually  improved  their  relative  posi- 
tion  by quite  a bit. This means  that  if low-skilled  workers  had  been form- 
ing expectations in the mid-1960s  about the wages they could expect, 
either by being in the work force themselves or by being in school and 
looking  at the labor  market  experience  of older  siblings,  they would  have 
found  their  actual  wages from 1970  to around  1974  higher  than  expected. 
Yet figure  5 shows that  the pattern  of employment  deteriorates  quite  rap- 
idly starting  in 1967.  This discrepancy  suggests  that something  was rais- 
ing nonemployment  rates for this group  before any deterioration  of the 
relative  wage. 
Third,  it would have been helpful  for the authors  to have spelled out 
a more  complete supply  and demand  framework,  even if they could not 
estimate  all of the structural  parameters.  They conclude that the rise in 
nonemployment  resulted  from  a shift  in demand,  but important  changes 
on the labor  supply  side should  also have been accounted  for. For  exam- 
ple, major  demographic  shifts have occurred.  The baby boom caused a 
temporary  surge of entrants  into the labor  market.  These workers  pre- 
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who may be much  older. Moreover,  the influx  of women into the work 
force during  this period  may have worsened  the competitive  position  of 
low-skilled  workers. 
Their analysis does not say much about the cross elasticities of de- 
mand  for workers  with different  skill levels. At first glance, there is a 
case for including  the relative wages of other types of workers in an 
equation explaining  the demand for some particular  type of worker. 
Even on the supply  side, I think  there  might  be a case for including  rela- 
tive wages as a determinant  of labor supply. I have a vested interest  in 
their method, because in 1977  James Tobin and I estimated a Phillips 
curve-a  form  of labor  supply-that  suggested  relative  wages might  be 
a relevant  variable. 
This same issue takes me to the authors'  labor supply schedule (the 
bottom panel of figure  4). If one considered what labor supply would 
have looked like 50 years ago, or what it would look like in Southeast 
Asia or in Latin  America  today, one would not expect the people at the 
bottom of that wage distribution  to be reducing  their labor supply. In 
fact, hours of work were higher  50 years ago, even for very low-wage 
workers. One reason might  be that relative  wages are an important  de- 
terminant  of labor supply. In a society where people can earn 20 times 
what the lowest-paid worker earns, a low-skilled worker might think 
twice about taking the menial low-wage  jobs. An alternative  variable 
that could explain  why today's labor  supply  schedule  is in a very differ- 
ent position from the schedule of 50 years ago was suggested  by Janet 
Yellen and by other discussants, namely  that alternative  sources of in- 
come are available  to low-wage  workers. 
Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Topel discuss the macroeconomy,  and  in the end 
I agree with them that deficient  aggregate  demand  is not a convincing 
explanation  for the rise in nonemployment.  Nonetheless, I suspect that 
other observers of the labor market  may be less convinced. If instead 
of talking  about the natural  rate of unemployment,  one were to use the 
NAIRU, the nonaccelerating  inflation  rate  of unemployment,  then  an in- 
crease in the NAIRU could come about  because of some change  in the 
inflationary  environment.  Inflationary  shocks, supply  shocks, or energy 
price shocks might  cause a higher  NAIRU than  expected. The tests that 
the authors  give, although  useful, were not as transparent  to me as they 
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helpful.  One could pose the question:  What  would unemployment  rates 
have been if GNP had  been higher  relative  to some measure  of potential 
GNP? 
The authors'  discussion  of wage flexibility  struck  me as a little  decep- 
tive. There  is a difference  between  the wage  flexibility  for  a givenjob and 
the wage flexibility  within a cohort of workers. In discussions of wage 
stickiness in the macroeconomic  context, wages for a job are normally 
considered. The issue is a short-run  phenomenon:  when aggregate  de- 
mand  falls, or demand  in a particular  sector  falls, then  the wages of those 
individual  jobs are  not very flexible.  In fact, recent  work, particularly  by 
Larry  Summers  and various coauthors, has shown that relative wages 
within  an industry  are extraordinarily  persistent. 
This form  of wage flexibility  differs  markedly  from  the wage flexibil- 
ity associated with the willingness of entering  cohorts or existing co- 
horts to accept the available  jobs at the going wages. And the authors 
have shown that there is considerable  cohort  flexibility,  since the wage 
distribution  has widened  so much. But, in a way, the findings  of this pa- 
per suggest  limits  to that flexibility,  too. The authors'  own labor  supply 
schedule,  which  is very flat  at the bottom,  points  to little  flexibility  at the 
lower end of the distribution.  Workers  are willing  to accept low wages 
down to a certain  point, but beyond that  they reduce  their  labor  supply. 
Another issue that I thought  could have been mentioned  was wage 
gradients-the extent to which  low-wage  jobs have higher  rates of wage 
growth. In 1973, a big debate was spawned by Martin  Feldstein, who 
commented  on the high  natural  rate  of unemployment  in the U.S  . econ- 
omy up to that  point. Much  of the evidence he used involved a compari- 
son of the relatively  unfavorable  U.S. labor  market  conditions  with the 
relatively  favorable  conditions  in Europe. He cited the minimum  wage 
as a major  reason why the United States had high unemployment  and 
high  nonparticipation  among  teenagers. 
The argument  that  Feldstein  made  was forceful.  He said  that  the mini- 
mum wage prevented low-skilled workers from taking very low-wage 
jobs with  prospects  for advancement.  If this argument  had  been correct, 
allowing  wages at the bottom of the distribution  to fall would actually 
have increased  the amount  of employment  and would have decreased 
the amount of unemployment.  The real minimum  wage in the United 
States has been falling,  at least until  the past couple years, as a result  of 
rising  prices and  a stable  nominal  minimum  wage. So a greater  opportu- Chinhui  Juhn, Kevin  M. Murphy,  and  Robert  H. Topel  137 
nity existed for low-skilled workers to take jobs that had on-the-job 
training,  thereby  enhancing  their  skills  and  moving  up the wage distribu- 
tion. That  has not worked  out. 
My final  comments  concern  adjustments  or responses to the relative 
wage changes that have been documented  in this paper. In an efficient 
market  with flexible workers and flexible technology, one would have 
expected adjustments  on both the demand  and supply side of the labor 
market  that would have ameliorated  the wage inequality  and the rise in 
nonemployment.  One reason given for the decline in the demand  for 
low-skilled  workers  is that  there  has been technological  change  favoring 
skilled  workers. However, the direction  of technological  change is not 
immutable.  Employers  must realize that low-skilled workers have be- 
come very cheap in our economy, a realization  that could have induced 
endogenous  change, such as new easy-to-operate  machines  or software 
that economized  on the need for skills. The fact that retailers  now have 
cash registers  with pictures of the products, or with laser scanners to 
enter data, is an example of exactly this phenomenon.  But clearly this 
response  has not been fast enough  to prevent  the relative  wage changes. 
In addition,  and perhaps  more important,  one would expect utility- 
maximizing  individuals  to make different decisions concerning their 
skill  accumulation  in response  to the changing  rewards  for skills. Again, 
some of that has been happening.  Enrollments  in various kinds of col- 
leges and schools have been rising  as people have decided  that skills are 
needed to earn a decent standard  of living. But again, that adjustment 
has not happened  at the appropriate  rate. 
The weakness  of the response  of low-skilled  workers  to the decline  of 
their  relative  wages suggests  possible  pathologies  at the lower end of the 
labor market.  Why is it that an appropriate  upgrading  of skills has not 
taken  place? Breakups  of families, drugs,  and crime  are among  the fac- 
tors that  come up in conversation.  It would  be interesting  to know more 
about  the people who are reducing  their  labor  supply  or dropping  out of 
the work force completely. To the normal  reader of Time  and News- 
week, this paper  reads as though  it were written  in a vacuum:  Who are 
these people? What  are they doing?  And how does it relate  to any of the 
prominent  social problems  in this country? 
One issue that  comes to mind  is immigration.  I remember  Mike  Piore 
at a Brookings  conference  in 1980  warning  of a pattern  within  the labor 
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menial  jobs because those jobs are much better  than the ones they had 
left behind. This pattern  applies to emigrants  from low-wage countries 
and to migrants  from rural  areas in the United States to urban  areas. 
However, the next generation-the children  of those workers-are  not 
willing  to accept the same menial  jobs. They have become socialized  to 
American expectations. Watching  television may not just erode the 
brain,  it may also socialize individuals  to a certain  view of what a living 
standard  should  be and what their role should  be in society. So prefer- 
ences shift with the generations, affecting  the willingness of different 
generations  to participate  in the labor  force. 
Because the typical pattern  of immigration  has been changing,  the 
problems  that  Piore  described  may  well have become worse and  may  be 
contributing  to the flatness  of the labor  supply  schedule  at its lower end. 
In the 1950s  and 1960s  immigrants  came  from  Europe  and  many  had  skill 
levels that were as high as or higher  than average. By contrast, in the 
1970s  and the 1980s  immigrants  have had lower skills than the average 
population.  Faced  with  the evidence  in this  paper,  it may  be time  to think 
about  the wisdom  of current  immigration  policy. 
Juhn, Murphy,  and Topel have painted  a convincing  and rather  dis- 
turbing  picture of recent trends in the U.S. labor market. Changes  in 
technology  or changes  in product  demand  have left low-skilled  workers 
holding  the short end of the stick. Rather  than upgrading  their skills, 
these workers  have reduced  their labor supply. There is a serious mis- 
match  between  the skills  of the work  force and  the skills  needed  for well- 
payingjobs. 
General Discussion 
Franco  Modigliani  wondered  what  the relationship  is between  the au- 
thors' concept of the natural  rate and the usual definition,  which is the 
unemployment  rate below which inflation  starts increasing.  According 
to the usual  definition  the natural  rate might  actually  have declined  dur- 
ing the 1980s. Gary Burtless provided  an alternative  to Janet Yellen's 
view that  the concentration  of labor  supply  response  in a relatively  small 
group of individuals  was evidence of involuntary  unemployment.  Ac- 
cording  to Burtless not all labor supply decisions should be viewed as 
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wage  rate. Deciding  to retire  a bit earlier  is also a marginal  decision. Yet 
in a Current  Population  Survey that only looks at one year of people's 
lives, this will look like a large  nonmarginal  change by a small number 
of people. 
Burtless also commented  on the role of transfers  in explaining  the 
long spells of unemployment.  If transfers  were responsible  for the re- 
ported  change  in labor supply, they should  have gotten gradually  more 
generous over the period. However, this is not what happened  in im- 
portant  categories  of transfers.  The disability  insurance  program,  after 
being  greatly  liberalized  between the mid-  1960s  and  the mid-  1970s,  was 
then dramatically  scaled back. Old age insurance and social security 
benefits were scaled back starting  in 1979 and again in 1983. Similar 
things  happened  to unemployment  benefits  during  the 1980s.  Robert  To- 
pel agreed  that  availability  of transfer  income of various  kinds  could ac- 
count  for a supply  shift. He  judged  that  such  a shift  occurred  by the early 
1970s  and that most of the observed movement  after that reflected  de- 
mand  shifting  along a fairly stable supply schedule. Robert Hall noted 
that  the data  can be interpreted  in two main  ways: one, suggested  by the 
authors,  is that technological  change  has shifted  the composition  of de- 
mand  away from lower-skilled  workers;  another,  presented  by Hall in 
his comments  on the Cutler  and Katz paper in this volume, is that the 
quality of labor supplied by lower-wage workers has changed. Hall 
noted  that  the technology-bias  story  requires  a low elasticity  of substitu- 
tion between skill groups to generate such a large change in relative 
wages. A priori  he found  this unlikely  and mentioned  the very high sub- 
stitution  found  across age groups  as evidence to the contrary.  More  con- 
trary evidence is that the very large increase in the labor supply of 
women was accompanied  not by a decrease but by a dramatic  increase 
in the relative  wages of women. 
Hall emphasized  that the postwar period can be divided into a long 
period of steady, fairly rapid growth in overall productivity  and real 
wages for all income  groups  ending  in 1970,  followed  by a period  of gen- 
eral real wage stagnation,  with a dramatic  decline in real wages in the 
lower deciles. This suggested  the need to explain  why the early 1970s  is 
the turning  point, both with respect to wage patterns  across skill groups 
and the evolution of real wages and productivity  in general. Hall ac- 
knowledged  that the divergence  of wages across income groups  within 
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changes in the educational  system affecting  the development  of skills, 
presumably  among  only the youngest cohorts. But he also found it im- 
plausible  that  technology  simultaneously  slowed in general  and  changed 
in a way that favored  high-skilled  workers. Richard  Cooper, observing 
that  almost  all the discussion  had focused on factors specific  to U.S. in- 
dustry  and U.S. labor  markets,  noted that  the slowdown  in productivity 
after  the early 1970s  was a worldwide  phenomenon,  suggesting  its expla- 
nation  is likely to be worldwide,  such as the baby boom or the increase 
in world  oil prices. Hall mentioned  the efficiency  wage theory  as still an- 
other explanation  of the decline in the relative wages of the low paid. 
According  to that  theory, the more  nonwork  alternatives  there  are at the 
lowest end of the wage distribution,  the less disciplinary  effect is pro- 
vided by a given wage level. Thus the growth  of nonwork  alternatives 
would not only make labor supply more elastic but would also reduce 
the effective quality  of work. 
Christopher  Sims noted that most of the discussion  assumed  that  the 
individuals  in a given wage decile were essentially the same over time. 
He wondered whether the objective characteristics  of the workers in 
various wage categories, such as age, race, and education, were con- 
stant  across time. William  Brainard  noted that  because the skills and  at- 
titudes  of workers  are  not accounted  for in the authors'  methodology  the 
relationships  cannot be thought  of as conventional  labor  supply sched- 
ules, which describe the labor supplied  by an individual  or group  with 
fixed characteristics  as wages vary. Sims also wondered  whether  indi- 
viduals tended to stay in the same wage category through  time. This 
would be relevant in the assessment of Yellen's story about people 
queuing  up for good  jobs. Topel suggested  that Yellen's argument  that 
people have to wait longer  to find  a good  job does not appear  consistent 
with the fact that  one cannot  explain  very much  of the change  in income 
inequality  by shifting shares of employment between high- and low- 
wage industries. He noted that an increase in the variance of wages 
could also be due to a change in the distribution  of good and bad  jobs 
within industries.  Blinder  noted that if it is primarily  the workers  with 
the lowest wages who are pulled  out of the work  force, this should  push 
up average  wages, which is not what happened  in this period. Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel  141 
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